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SPECIES CONSERVATION & RECOVERY THROUGH
ADEQUATE REGULATORY MECHANISMS
Sandra B. Zellmer*, SamuelJ. Panarella*, and Oliver Finn Wood*
INTRODUCTION
The world is experiencing its sixth episode of mass extinction of life. In
rhetoric typically used by bloggers rather than scientists, the National Academy
of Sciences reports that this "biological annihilation" is more dire than previ-
ously believed,' and that the decimation of biodiversity and of the ecosystem
services resulting from it is nothing less than a "frightening assault on the foun-
dations of human civilization."2
Unlike previous episodes of mass extinction, this one is caused by human
overpopulation, overconsumption, and anthropogenic climate change. The
United States has been a world conservation leader for over a century, but its
commitment to supporting biodiversity is flagging while its contributions to the
causes of extinction, including responsibility for 14 percent of global green-
house gas emissions,' are growing. Although the United States is only one
player in this crisis, its legal mandates for biodiversity protection, including
those contained in the Endangered Species Act,
4 have proved essential for com-
batting extinction when assessed in the context of both global leadership and
on-the-ground impacts.
Due to its broad influence on the field of biodiversity law and its overarch-
ing goal to conserve threatened and endangered species, this article focuses on
the Endangered Species Act ("ESA" or "Act") and analyzes whether and when
regulatory mechanisms are adequate for conservation and recovery purposes
under the Act. Within the United States, identifying effective measures for the
coordination of conservation efforts across federal, state, tribal, and local juris-
dictional boundaries is critical for the preservation of species. To date, most of
the attention on the efficacy of such measures has been focused on the pre-
listing phase and the private-public candidate conservation agreements aimed at
forestalling or preventing the listing of an imperiled species. Little attention has
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1. Gerardo Ceballos, Paul R. Ehrlich & Rodolfo Dirzo, BiologicalAnnihilation Via the Ongoing
Sixth Mass Extinction Signaled by Vertebrate Population Losses and Declines, 114 PROc. NAT'L
AcAD. Sci. E6089, E6090 (2017).
2. Id.
3. Brad Plumer, Carbon Dioxide Emissions Hit a Record in 2019, Even as Coal Fades, N.Y.
TIMEs (Dec. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/A8QW-2477.
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2018).
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been paid to the post-listing phase of species recovery and the critical question
of whether the continued recovery of recently delisted species would be en-
hanced by keeping adequate regulatory mechanisms in place after the ESA's
statutory protections have fallen away. Strengthening provisions for species re-
covery requires political connectivity and coordination. In particular, the popu-
lation health of apex predators such as grizzly bears and wolves, as well as many
fish and bird species, depends on cooperation between the several entities
charged with conservation responsibility.
The degree of threat of extinction faced by a species dictates its listing
category under the ESA.s A species that is in danger of extinction throughout
"all or a significant portion of its range" is listed as an "endangered" species.6 A
"threatened" species is one that "is likely to become endangered in the foresee-
able future throughout all or a significant portion of its range."7 Accordingly,
ESA listing and delisting decisions often turn on the "inadequacy of existing
regulatory mechanisms" beyond the ESA that have been adopted to protect
species and their habitat within and across jurisdictional lines.' At the pre-list-
ing stage, such mechanisms are often included in candidate conservation agree-
ments ("CCAs") between federal agencies, state and local governments, and
private actors.9 Listing may be avoided if a CCA provides an effective tool for
conserving the species. Similarly, delisting or downlisting may occur if adequate
mechanisms are in place to manage a recovered species and to ensure that it
does not wind up on the ESA list again or, worse yet, go extinct. Instead of
CCAs, regulatory mechanisms at the delisting or downlisting stage are some-
times included in memoranda of understandings or other agreements, which
tend to be more variable in nature than CCAs.o
The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service ("FWS"), as the ESA listing agency, has
a spotty litigation track record when it comes to assessing the adequacy of regu-
latory mechanisms and deploying them as a substitute for ESA protections.'
On both ends of the listing and delisting spectrum, objective, measurable, and
enforceable criteria, secured by sufficient funding and a clear implementation
timeline, are key. Although there have been far fewer instances of delisting than
there have been of listing a species, much of the relevant information about best
5. Id. § 1532(6).
6. Id.
7. Id. § 1532(20).
8. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(D).
9. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS 1 (2017),
[hereinafter CCA FACTSHEET] https://perma.cc/PQQ6-NLQV.
10. See infra Part IV (Adequate and Inadequate Regulatory Mechanisms in the Delisting
Context).
11. The ESA delegates authority for terrestrial species to FWS, and to the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") Fisheries for marine and anadromous species,
sometimes collectively referred to as "the Services." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2018).
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practices for species conservation and recovery comes from delisting decisions
because delisting is, or should be, the culmination of recovery under the ESA.12
We begin by examining the use of regulatory mechanisms in the listing
process to identify circumstances where the adoption of such measures in
CCAs are adequate for a decision not to list a species, or to list it as threatened
rather than endangered. We then turn to delisting decisions and assess the vari-
ous tools that have been used to justify removing ESA protections for a species.
We examine four controversial, high-stakes listing decisions: the Barton
Springs salamander, coastal steelhead, Arctic grayling, and greater sage-grouse.
We then turn to two delisting decisions-the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem
("GYE") grizzly bear and the Great Lakes gray wolf-and assess the judicial
treatment of regulatory measures chosen to support these decisions. One theme
emerges: the potential for relisting under the ESA is not, by itself, an adequate
regulatory mechanism for species recovery and conservation. Reinitiating the
listing process takes too long due to political controversy and the FWS's limited
budget and other priorities. Meanwhile, the species that was supposedly recov-
ered may have lost the ground that was gained prior to delisting and may even
be closer to the brink of extinction, contrary to the overarching conservation
goal of the ESA.13
In Part I of this Article, we discuss the conservation goals of the ESA and
the statutory requirements for listing and delisting species, highlighting the ori-
gins and requirements of CCAs, which have become a key tool for keeping
species off the endangered species list. Part II considers the nature of recovery,
recovery plans, and the adequacy of regulatory mechanisms in the delisting con-
text. Part III assesses the judicial reception to the use of CCAs in listing deci-
sions, while Part IV looks at litigation over adequate regulatory mechanisms in
the delisting context. In Part V, we analyze the potential for employing some-
thing akin to a CCA in the delisting context, so that the FWS can retain
meaningful control and responsibility for species conservation even after delist-
ing and important players, including other federal agencies, states, tribes, and
private landowners, can maintain mechanisms that are truly adequate for spe-
cies conservation and readily enforceable by agencies and interested members of
the public. We consider the merits of recovery plans and CCAs, and we ulti-
mately recommend the creation of a new tool for species conservation and re-
covery, the Recovery Conservation Agreement, and flesh out a few essential
components of such an agreement. Finally, the article draws lessons from listing
12. Dale D. Goble, The Endangered Species Act: What We Talk About When We Talk About Recov-
ery, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 1 (2009) [hereinafter Goble, Talk]
13. Noah Greenwald et al., Extinction and the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 7 PEERJ e6803, at 5
(2019), https://perma.cc/SJU2-TPXC (finding that 47 species went extinct while waiting to
be listed); see also Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1029 (9th Cir.
2011) ("We reject out of hand any suggestion that the future possibility of relisting a species
can operate as a reasonable justification for delisting.").
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and delisting controversies in an effort to illuminate pathways for political, le-
gal, and biological coordination and connectivity, which in turn supports con-
servation and recovery of imperiled species and biodiversity.
I. MEETING THE ESA's CONSERVATION GOALS THROUGH LISTING,
DELISTING, AND RECOVERY
As the nation's premier federal wildlife conservation statute, the ESA "is a
powerful, focused statute that can bring species back from the brink of extinc-
tion."14 Once a species comes within the ambit of the ESA through a listing
decision, the law provides a comprehensive panoply of protections to that spe-
cies to promote its recovery. Simply put, no other federal or state law provides
similarly focused and comprehensive protections against common threats facing
imperiled species."s Other measures, including statutes, regulations, conserva-
tion easements, and land use provisions, incidentally protect wildlife habitat
while advancing other explicit objectives, such as maintaining water quality, but
do not ensure ongoing, species-specific management like the ESA.16 The ESA
provides protection to listed species that is "all but irreplaceable," as no other
federal or state laws are capable of providing the same level of protection for
these species." But these protective measures are not intended to last forever;
rather, they are a means to an end. The ESA envisions a point at which a
recovered species no longer needs statutory protection and can be delisted.
Delisting a recovered species counts as a success story for the species and,
in many cases, for the ecosystem it occupies. It also provides assurances of an
"end point" to what some perceive as heavy-handed federal control and frees up
federal resources for other species in need. However, while the delisting of a
species is fairly characterized as the ultimate "win" under the ESA-a formerly
threatened or endangered species has recovered to the point that it no longer
requires the ESA's protective umbrella-it also reveals the binary nature of spe-
cies protection in the United States, where the uniqueness of the ESA and its
domination of the field of species protection can turn from an advantage to a
disadvantage. A delisted species suddenly moves from nurture to nature, left
mostly to its own devices as it continues its often still tenuous path to long-
term viability. This abrupt shift, along with the lack of transitional legal and
regulatory protective mechanisms, can present a significant challenge to delisted
species. In some cases, it can lead to a relisting of a species that fails to thrive
without the protections of the ESA.
14. Goble, supra note 12, at 16-17.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 17.
17. Dale D. Goble, Recovery, in AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF ENV'T, ENERGY, & REs, EN-
DANGERED SPECIEs ACT: LAw, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 70, 75 (Donald C. Baur &
Wn. Robert Irvin eds., 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Goble, Recovery]
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The time has come to reconsider the on/off dichotomy of species conser-
vation under the ESA. By utilizing protective mechanisms, such as CCAs, that.
have proven effective in some cases in avoiding the necessity of listing a species
to provide transitional protections in the post-delisting phase, the chances of a
successful recovery for a delisted species can be improved.
A. Conservation and Recovery
The ESA strives to conserve threatened and endangered species and the
"ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend."
The statute defines conservation as "the use of all methods and procedures
which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to
the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer
necessary."" Digging deeper into the statutory definitions shows how conserva-
tion, for purposes of the ESA, turns in part on extinction prevention and, ulti-
mately, species recovery.20
For a species to be "endangered" means it is "in danger of extinction,"
while a "threatened" species is "likely to become . .. endangered . .. within the
foreseeable future."21 Thus, in its listing decisions, the FWS must consider both
the probability of extinction and the time period within which extinction may
occur.22 The ESA requires the FWS to employ science, rather than politics or
economics, in making these decisions,23 but even when utilizing the best availa-
ble data about the health of a species, the likelihood of its extinction in any
given temporal horizon is inherently uncertain.
2 4
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018); see also Samuel J. Panarella, For the Birds: Wind Enery, Dead
Eagles, and Unwelcome Surprises, 20 HASTINGs W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 3, 38 n.135
(2014) ("[T]he Act's failure to define the term 'ecosystems' and its lack of any ecosystem
protection requirements has resulted in the ESA's primary use being the preservation of
individual species.").
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
20. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001) ("'Conser-
vation' is a much broader concept than mere survival," it also "speaks to the recovery" of
listed species.); Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059,
1070 (9th Cir. 2004) (indicating that "conservation" includes both survival and recovery).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20); see also 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d) (2019) (providing that, for a
"threatened" determination, the "term foreseeable future extends only so far into the future
as the Services can reasonably determine that both the future threats and the species' re-
sponses to those threats are likely").
22. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20); 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d). The ESA delegates authority to the
Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce, acting through the FWS and, for marine species,
the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"). 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(15), 1533(a)(1). For
ease of reference, we use FWS throughout this article.
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
24. See Goble, Talk, supra note 12, at 7; see also id. at 11 ("Extinction is a complex, poorly
understood probabilistic process. Thus, the science of extinction would be indeterminate even
Species Conservation 3712020]
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The science of conservation biology can provide mortality rates, reproduc-
tion rates, and other quantifiable measurements of a population, and it can shed
light on genetic robustness and essential habitat structure and processes, but
other key variables are extremely difficult-if not impossible-to predict. These
include natural fluctuations in the physical environment, such as temperature,
precipitation, invasive species (especially competitors and parasites), diseases,
and catastrophes that occur at random intervals, such as hurricanes, floods,
wildfires, and earthquakes.25 Questions of scientific certainty aside, how much
risk society is willing to tolerate of extinction for particular species is even more
uncertain, and science cannot answer that question.2 6 Risk tolerance is a ques-
tion of ethics, policy, and law, not science.27 It also depends on factors based in
human emotion, such as the affection for and appeal of a particular species, that
data-driven science cannot capture. For example, there appears to be a much
greater generalized sense of societal concern about the possible extinction of a
charismatic (and in this case, totemic) species such as the bald eagle than there
is for lesser known species of insects, such as the American burying beetle,
which few people outside of a small group of entomologists know exist.28
The ESA sets tight deadlines for listing decisions,29 yet it takes more than
twelve years, on average, to provide a species with statutory protection.0 Broad
policy shifts between political administrations and the amount of funding allo-
cated to listing processes have played a role in the slow pace of listing in the
if we had complete knowledge of all the factors that affect the process-and our knowledge
is far from complete.").
25. See id. at 9 (quoting Mark L. Shaffer, Minimum Population Sizes for Species Conservation, 31
BIoSCIENCE 131, 132 (1981)).
26. See id at 12 ("Although science can inform this judgment (by shedding light on the risk), it
cannot-given the gap between the descriptive and the prescriptive-make the actual ac-
ceptability decision.").
27. Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future ofthe Endangered SpeciesAct's Best Available
Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 420 (2004).
28. See James Ming Chen, The Fragile Menagerie: Biodiversity Loss, Climate Change, and the
Law, 93 IND. L.J. 303, 343 (2018) (noting "the longstanding legal preference for large,
charismatic fauna over all other forms of biodiversity"); Jason C. Rylander, Recovering En-
dangered Species in Difficult Times: Can the ESA Go Beyond Mere Salvage?, 42 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,017, 10,022 (2012) ("A disproportionate amount of funding has gone to popular
vertebrate species at the expense of many others.").
29. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (2018).
30. Emily E. Puckett, Dylan C. Kesler & Noah Greenwald, Taxa, Petitioning Agency, and Law-
suits Affect Time Spent Awaiting Listing Under the US Endangered Species Act, 201 BIOLOGI-
CAL CONSERVATION 220, 225 (2016).
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past forty years." Prolonged delays in listing may perpetuate population de-
clines and obstruct species recovery efforts.3 2
Once a species is listed, the ESA's recovery goal comes into focus. Al-
though "recovery" is not defined in the ESA, it could be read to mean that a
recovered species is one that is no longer at risk of near-term or foreseeable
extinction, and by implication is no longer in need of the ESA's protection."
3
FWS policy defines the term "recovery" as "the process by which the decline of
an endangered or threatened species is arrested or reversed, and threats to its
survival neutralized, so that its long-term survival in nature can be ensured."
3 4
The objective, according to the FWS, is the "maintenance of secure, self-sus-
taining wild populations of species.""5 There are two fundamental components
to species recovery: (1) biological recovery, where the population and distribu-
tion of the species has improved to the point at which it no longer faces an
unacceptable risk of extinction, and (2) ongoing regulatory measures that man-
age any remaining threats "so that the species will not fall back below the via-
bility threshold that led to its delisting."36
If recovery is achieved, delisting will follow. 7 However, recovery is not the
only reason for delisting. As of February 2020, the FWS has delisted 90 species
(just over 1% of listed species) since the passage of the ESA, but only 59 of
those delisted were due to recovery." Others were taken off the list because
31. Id. at 226-27; Rylander, supra note 28, at 10,021-22. Also, the track record for plants and
invertebrates is slower than for vertebrates, id., especially "charismatic megafauna."
32. See Greenwald et al., supra note 13, at 5 (finding that "[p]rotection under the ESA came too
late for the 71 species last seen prior to listing," and that 42 species went extinct while under
consideration for listing).
33. See Goble, Talk, supra note 12, at 2 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3)).
34. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR PLANNING AND COORDI-
NATING RECOVERY OF ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIEs 1 (1990), https://perma
.cc/EEM5-JSX3 [hereinafter RECOVERY POLICY]. This definition remains in place today.
See, e.g., Glossary, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.: MIDWEST REGION ENDANGERED SPE-
CIES, https://perma.cc/HJ64-2PUG (retaining a near-identical definition of recovery).
35. RECOVERY POLICY, supra note 34, at 1.
36. See Goble, Recovery, supra note 17, at 74-75, 85.
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii). New regulations were issued on Aug. 27, 2019, that, among
other things, revise the language of 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d) to eliminate species recovery as a
key basis for delisting. See generally Regulations for Listing Species and Designating Critical
Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. 45,020 (Aug. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424). FWS
claims that it removed the word "recovery" from § 424.11(d) "because the existing regulatory
language, which was intended to provide examples of when a species should be removed
from the lists, has been, in some instances, misinterpreted as establishing criteria for delist-
ing." Id. at 45,035. It states that "the language will continue to include species that have
recovered, because recovered species would no longer meet the definition of either an 'en-
dangered species' or a 'threatened species.'" Id. According to FWS, "[t]his provision does not
undermine the importance or effectiveness of recovery plans." Id.
38. Delisted Species, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.:ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION ONLINE SYs-
TEM (Feb. 23, 2020) [hereinafter Delisted Species], https://perma.cc/LM72-M2GB; Kevin
3732020]
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they went extinct, the FWS determined that the listed species is in fact not a
distinct taxonomic species, or new information demonstrated that the species
was in fact not threatened or endangered in the first place.9
B. Listing and Delisting Factors
Section 4 of the ESA requires the FWS to analyze five factors in deter-
mining whether to list or delist a species:
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtail-
ment of its habitat or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educa-
tional purposes;
(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued
existence.40
A finding that any one of these factors is met may support a listing deci-
sion.4 1 A delisting decision requires consideration of the same five factors, but a
recovery-based delisting decision will only be upheld if none of these factors
presents an ongoing threat to the species.42
By listing relevant factors without providing any hierarchy or structure for
their application, Congress has left broad discretion to the FWS to decide "how
much weight to give each factor."43 The FWS's discretion is limited somewhat,
however, by the statutory requirement that listing and delisting decisions must
be made "solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available
... taking into account those efforts, if any, being made by any State .. . to
protect such species whether by predator control, protection of habitat and food
supply, or other conservation practices."" The requirement to take state species
Anderton, After 45 Years The Endangered Species Act Continues To Make Progress, FORBES
(Apr. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/6SE8-B4RF.
39. Delisted Species, supra note 38; see, e.g., Removal of the Hualapai Mexican Vole from the
Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 82 Fed. Reg. 28,582, 28,586 (June 23,
2017) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (concluding that delisting was warranted because the
listed subspecies was "not a valid taxonomic entity").
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1).
41. 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(c) (2019).
42. See id. § 424.11(e); see also Greenwald et al., supra note 13 (discussing FWS's removal of the
word "recovery" from its revised regulations).
43. Wildwest Inst. v. Kurth, 855 F.3d 995, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017) ("We conclude that nothing in
the ESA, its legislative history, or FWS's own guidelines requires FWS to make its listing
decisions based solely on the [Listing Priority Number] assigned under the guidelines or on
the degree of threat a species faces.").
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
conservation efforts into account applies to a decision by the FWS to list or
reclassify a species.45 Despite other priorities or influences, listing and delisting
decisions must be driven by science, not by economics
4
6 or politics. 4 7
In addition to the requirement that the FWS consider in its listing deci-
sions efforts being made by states to protect imperiled species,
4
8 the ESA also
encourages "States and other interested parties . . . to develop and maintain
conservation programs" to safeguard fish and wildlife.
49 One central purpose of
the Act is to foster federal-state cooperation in the conservation of threatened
or endangered species."' Requiring the FWS to take state and local regulatory
mechanisms to protect species into account in its listing, reclassification, and
delisting decisions is one means of fostering cooperation. By focusing on ex-
isting regulatory mechanisms, Factor D brings this requirement to the fore-
front. The remainder of this section will define regulatory mechanisms and
describe how they are (or can be) developed and implemented through private-
public agreements in the listing and delisting processes.
1. Regulatory Mechanisms
Four of the five Section 4 factors were present in the 1969 version of the
ESA5 ' and were carried over to the modern ESA, enacted in 1973.52 Factor
D-the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms-was added in 1973.11
Although the legislative history is silent regarding the addition of Factor D, it
45. 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(c), (e), (f).
46. See Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2010); H.R. REP.
No. 97-567, at 20 (1982) (emphasizing the intent to remove economic considerations from
"any phase of the listing process").
47. See Madeline June Kass, Strategic Dodging of ESA Listing Determinations, 29 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 54, 55 (2015) ("Congressional listing exceptions, motivated by political
exigencies and special interests, aim to circumvent the ESA's science-based approach to list-
ing."); Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institu-
tional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 87 (2001)
("If flexibility comes without accountability, the agencies, subjected to intense political pres-
sure, will use it to duck controversy rather than to incorporate the best new science into their
decisions."); see also Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 23, 25 n.4, 26
(D.D.C. 1996) (overturning decision not to list the Archipelago wolf in part because the
factors listed by FWS as weighing against listing included minimizing conflict with Alaska's
congressional delegation).
48. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (b)(1)(A).
49. Id. § 1531(a)(5).
50. Humane Soc'y of U.S. v. Zinke, 865 F.3d 585, 598 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
51. Endangered Species Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 3, 83 Stat. 275, 275 (1969).
52. Kevin Cassidy, Endangered Species' Slippery Slope Back to the States: Existing Regulatory Mech-
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appears that "the perception that [existing] state and local regulations to protect
wildlife were inadequate was a major impetus."5 4 In all likelihood, Congress
added Factor D "to prod states and localities into adopting more adequate laws
to protect imperiled species and their habitat."ss
The plain language of Factor D suggests that, to be given weight in the
listing or delisting decision, the protective mechanism must be existing, not
prospective, and it also must be regulatory, not voluntary or otherwise non-
binding.s6 The FWS has interpreted both of these requirements relatively liber-
ally, however, with mixed results in court." Key cases addressing this are dis-
cussed below in Parts III and IV. On the listing side of the ledger, state and
local regulatory mechanisms protecting imperiled species are often included in
candidate conservation agreements, discussed in the next section.
2. Candidate Conservation Agreements as Regulatory Mechanisms
Another mechanism for fostering cooperation among various regulatory
bodies is through the use of candidate conservation agreements ("CCAs").
CCAs are agreements between the FWS and private or non-federal public par-
ties designed to encourage implementation of protective measures for species
that are candidates for listing." In some circumstances, the creation and imple-
mentation of a CCA may obviate the need to list the species.59
54. Id. (citing 93 CONG. REc. 25,679 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney (D-CA) ("Some argue
that the States should have their chance [to protect endangered species]. I argue that the
States have had their chance."))).
55. Id.
56. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D) (2018) (emphasis added).
57. Courts have rejected reliance on future measures to avoid listing. See In re Polar Bear Endan-
gered Species Act Listing & 4(d) Rule Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 113 n.56 (D.D.C. 2011),
affd, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("[T]he ESA does not permit FWS to consider specula-
tive future conservation actions . . . ."); Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp.
23, 26 (D.D.C. 1996) ("[T]he Secretary ... cannot use promises of future actions . . . ."); Or.
Nat. Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1154 (D. Or. 1998) ("NMFS may only
consider conservation efforts that are currently operational . . . ."); Friends of Wild Swan,
Inc. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 945 F. Supp. 1388, 1398 (D. Or. 1996) ("[FWS] cannot
rely upon its own speculations as to the future effects of another agency's management plans
. . . ."); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 939 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D.D.C. 1996)
("promises of proposed future actions [are not] an excuse" for not listing). Courts also re-
jected reliance on voluntary measures. See Or. Nat. Res. Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1155
(voluntary actions are "necessarily speculative" and cannot be relied on to preclude listing); Lf
Defs. of Wildlife v. Zinke, 849 F.3d 1077, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (non-binding measures in
Wyoming's wolf management plan were sufficient for delisting where the state was required
to meet the explicit requirement of maintaining at least 10 breeding pairs and 100 wolves on
state land).
58. See CCA FACTSHEET, supra note 9; see, e.g., Defs. of Wildlife & Ctr. for Biological Diver-
sity v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
59. See CCA FACTSHEET, supra note 9.
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The institutional history of CCAs began in the early 1980s, when the
FWS implemented a policy for voluntary agreements, called Conservation
Agreements ("CAs"), as an alternative to listing.60 These agreements allowed
the FWS to provide technical assistance to private landowners and state agen-
cies to address the threats posed to "candidate" species on the verge of listing.
6 '
Oriented towards the possibility of future resource use restrictions, CAs al-
lowed landowners and states to give input and share insight into future restric-
tions governing the management of the candidate species.
6 2
The FWS entered into CAs as long as the agreements "removed all known
threats [to the candidate species] that would otherwise warrant listing."
63 As
initially envisioned, CAs were not meant to substitute for the protections of-
fered by the ESA. If the threats to the continued viability of a species were such
that listing was justified, a CA was not intended to provide an alternative to
listing. Rather, CAs were intended to provide prophylactic protections for a
species that had reached the point of being a candidate for listing that might
forestall or, in some rare cases, avoid the necessity of listing.6 According to
FWS's 1983 policy:
The Service should never approach CAs as compromises foreclosing
the possibility of listing. The CA approach may not be a permanent
alternative to listing the species: in some cases it will only be an in-
terim measure postponing listing for tractable species helped by
others for some time period. It could be a permanent solution for
those few species which are recovered.65
In 1985, the FWS discontinued its use of CAs.66 But the FWS resumed
the use of CAs in 1992, with instructions to continue utilizing the 1983 Policy
60. Conservation Agreements for Candidate Species, Final Policy and Guidelines, at 2, attached
to Memorandum from John L. Spinks, Jr., Regional FWS Director, to Associate Director
Regarding Conservation Agreement Policy (Jan. 3, 1983) [hereinafter "1983 Policy"]; see also
U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-93-152, ENDANGERED SPECIES: FAC-
TORS ASSOCIATED WITH DELAYED LISTING DECISIONs (1993) [hereinafter ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES FACTORS].
61. See Announcement of Draft Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg.
32,183, 32,184-85 (June 12, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 CCA Draft Policy].
62. See id. at 32,185.
63. ENDANGERED SPECIES FACTORS, supra note 60, at 9.
64. Francesca Ortiz, Candidate Conservation Agreements as a Devolutionary Response to Extinc-
tion, 33 GA. L. REv. 413, 467-68 (1999).
65. 1983 Policy, supra note 60, at 2-3. The policy subsequently evolved away from this position.
See 1997 CCA Draft Policy, supra note 61, at 32,185 ("The ultimate goal of Candidate
Conservation Agreements developed under this policy is to encourage, to the extent feasible
and controllable by a participating property owner or State or local land management agency,
the removal of threats to the covered species so as to nullify the need to list them as
threatened or endangered under the Act.").
66. Ortiz, supra note 64, at 466-67; ENDANGERED SPECIES FACTORS, supra note 60, at 10.
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until a new policy could be developed.7 The 1992 initiative identified CAs as
"an appropriate mechanism to use to maximize the protection of a candidate
endangered or threatened species when [the agreement] effectively removes
known threats."" Its main thrust was to encourage states to protect species
within their borders and provide them with incentives to adopt measures that
would keep species off the ESA list.69
In 1994, the Clinton Administration sought an approach that would con-
serve species while encouraging economic development and participation by
private landowners.7 0 One piece of this approach was a new policy for CAs,
now renamed CCAs. Formalized in 1997, this policy encouraged landowners to
enter into voluntary agreements that include conservation measures to reduce
the probability of listing a candidate species.71 Under a CCA, a landowner or a
state or local agency promises to engage in efforts designed to conserve a candi-
date species. Such efforts might include commitments to avoid harmful land
uses, to restore habitat, to monitor the species' status, and to undertake other
efforts to minimize deleterious impacts on the candidate species.72 The explicit
goal was to "nullify the need to list" the species.73 To this end, each CCA was
required to include: (1) a description of the habitat requirements necessary to
sustain the population of candidate species; (2) the management activities each
landowner or state land management agency is willing to undertake to protect
the species; (3) an assessment of the resulting benefits to the species; (4) assur-
ances from the FWS that it will not require stricter management measures than
those originally agreed to; (5) monitoring to determine the efficacy of the man-
agement activities; and (6) notification to the FWS when an authorized taking
of the species will occur.74
To satisfy the 1997 CCA policy, the FWS had to reasonably expect that
these actions would remove the threat to the species.7 1 If a species subject to a
67. Ortiz, supra note 64, at 466.
68. ENDANGERED SPECIES FACTORS, supra note 60, at 9.
69. See Martha E. Phelps, Candidate Conservation Agreements and the Endangered Species Act:
Prospects and Perils of an Administrative Experiment, 25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 175, 176
(1997).
70. See Ortiz, supra note 64, at 464 ("Because many endangered and threatened species are lo-
cated on private lands, participation by the private sector was critical to the efficacy of any
management initiative."). Also in 1994, the Services entered into a memorandum of under-
standing with the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the National Park
Service "to establish a general framework for cooperation and participation ... in the conser-
vation of species that are tending toward federal listing" and to provide for the use of conser-
vation agreements for imperiled species on federal public lands. Id.
71. See 1997 CCA Draft Policy, supra note 61, at 32,185.
72. See id.; Ortiz, supra note 64, at 465.
73. 1997 CCA Draft Policy, supra note 61, at 32,185.
74. Id. at 32,186-87.
75. Id. at 32,185.
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CCA was eventually listed under the ESA, the FWS would ensure that no
additional "management actions" would be required of participating private
landowners and agencies beyond those adopted in the CCA.
76 Also, in the
event of listing, the 1997 CCA policy gave "assurances" to the participating
parties that, upon a proper application and showing, they would receive an inci-
dental take permit to allow them to continue permissible activities under the
CCA that might otherwise violate the ESA's section 9 take prohibitions.1
7 This
use of assurances to entice non-federal parties to participate in CCAs was the
precursor to the modern candidate conservation agreements with assurances
("CCAA"), adopted in 1999.78
The 1999 CCAA Policy explicitly provides assurances to non-federal par-
ticipants that no additional conservation measures will be required of them if
the species subject to the CCAA is listed in the future.
79 According to the
FWS:
[P]roperty owners are reluctant to implement conservation measures
for declining species because of possible future land, water, or re-
source use restrictions that may result from the Act's section 9 "take"
prohibitions if their conservation efforts cause a species to colonize
their lands or increase in numbers and the species is subsequently
listed as threatened or endangered. This policy is designed to provide
these property owners with the necessary assurances to remove these
concerns and encourage them to implement conservation measures
for these species.0
Unlike the 1997 CCA policy, the 1999 CCAA policy offered specific
guarantees to non-federal landowners that they would not be prosecuted for
continuing activities allowed in the CCAA in the event of a future listing."
1 In
76. Id. at 32,186-87.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Final Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,726,
32,727 (June 17, 1999). Federal agencies may enter into a CCA to conserve candidates or
other unlisted species, but without the assurances. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
DRAFT CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS WITH ASSURANCES HANDBOOK 8
(2003) (citing federal conservation and consultation obligations under sections 2(c)(1) and
7(a)(1) of the ESA). Federal agencies must instead comply with Section 7 requirements for
jeopardy-avoiding measures and incidental take statements. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2018).
80. 64 Fed. Reg. at 32,727.
81. See id. ("This policy is intended to facilitate the conservation of proposed and candidate
species, and species likely to become candidates in the near future by giving citizens, States,
local governments, Tribes, businesses, organizations, and other non-Federal property owners
incentives to implement conservation measures for declining species by providing certainty
with regard to land, water, or resource use restrictions that might be imposed should the
species later become listed as threatened or endangered under the Act.").
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the event of listing, landowners with a CCAA would be granted an incidental
take permit or an enhancement of survival permit to continue engaging in the
activities covered by the CCAA.82
The CCAA must identify reasonably anticipated changed circumstances
that could undermine the plan's provisions, such as modifications to covered
activities or drought, along with corresponding contingency responses." How-
ever, if unforeseen circumstances arise during the term of the CCAA, the per-
mittee is shielded from the imposition of additional restrictions. The permittee
may voluntarily adopt responsive measures beyond those specified in the
CCAA or other partners, including federal and state agencies, may address the
issues caused by the unforeseen circumstance.84
To evaluate the efficacy of CCAAs and other conservation measures, the
FWS adopted the Policy for Evaluation of Conservation Efforts ("PECE") in
2003.5 PECE identified criteria to be used "in determining whether formalized
conservation efforts that have yet to be implemented or to show effectiveness
contribute to making listing a species as threatened or endangered unneces-
sary."6 PECE established a two-part test for evaluating CCAs and CCAAs.
First, the FWS evaluates the certainty that the conservation efforts will be im-
plemented, given available resources, authority, and applicable mechanisms for
implementation." Second, the FWS evaluates the certainty that the efforts will
be effective at reducing threats to the species." PECE added that, in determin-
ing the effectiveness of the conservation efforts of other entities, the FWS
should "consider both current actions that affect a species' status and suffi-
82. 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(d)(1) (2019). In effect, the CCAA serves as the requisite habitat conser-
vation plan under Section 10 for actions that would otherwise "take" the species. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(1)(A).
83. Amelia Orton-Palmer, Candidate Conservation Agreements and Candidate Conservation
Agreements with Assurances Under the ESA, 2 MIN. L. SERIEs: ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L.
FOUND. 1, 9-11 (2012).
84. Id. at 9-13
85. Policy for Evaluation of Conservation Efforts When Making Listing Decisions, 68 Fed.
Reg. 15,100 (Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter PECE].
86. Id
87. Id. at 15,101. In evaluating the certainty that conservation efforts will be implemented, the
Services consider the high level of certainty that the resources necessary to carry out the
conservation efforts are available; the authority of the parties to the conservation efforts to
carry them out; the regulatory or procedural mechanisms in place to carry out the efforts; the
schedule for completing and evaluating the efforts; and if the conservation efforts rely on
voluntary participation, whether the incentives provided will ensure the requisite level of
participation. Id.
88. Id. In evaluating the certainty of whether the conservation efforts will be effective, the Ser-
vices consider the nature and extent of the threats to be addressed and how those threats are
reduced by the conservation effort; the specific conservation objectives; the appropriate steps
to reduce threats to the species; and "quantifiable performance measures to monitor for both
compliance and effectiveness." Id.
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ciently certain future actions-either positive or negative-that affect a species'
status."9
Although the ESA does not specifically authorize the FWS to enter into
CCAAs, the use of such agreements to conserve listed species finds support in
several sections of the statute.90 Under Section 7(a), in particular, all federal
agencies "shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and
shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter."
91
Other relevant sections of the ESA give the FWS authority to cooperate with
states for conservation of species,92 arguably including both listed and unlisted
species.93
A common-sense interpretation of the Act also argues for the use of con-
servation agreements to ameliorate and, in some circumstances even reverse, a
species' downward slide. The ultimate goal of the ESA is to conserve species
that might disappear without its protections. More often than not, humans are
the principal actors responsible for the conditions that threaten a species' con-
tinued existence, either directly, through, for example, overharvesting, or indi-
rectly, through, for example, anthropogenic climate change. Human-caused
threats to species do not begin when a species is listed under the ESA. Rather,
a species is listed as threatened or endangered as a result of pre-listing impacts
on its viability from humans. Given this, it makes sense to allow for the use of
pre-listing conservation agreements with the participants best able to take ac-
tion to reduce these impacts before listing becomes necessary. Waiting to adopt
conservation measures until after a species is listed is likely to require more
expensive efforts to address the degraded condition of the species' habitat and
to limit recovery options.9 4
In the decades since their creation, the use of conservation agreements as a
regulatory tool to forestall or prevent the listing of an imperiled species has
become a widely accepted practice in the ESA's pre-listing process. While there
is general agreement hat the FWS has the authority to use conservation agree-
ments to facilitate cooperation between private and public actors, litigants and
courts have disagreed over the requisite content of CCAs and CCAAs, as well
as the weight that these agreements should be given in the listing and recovery
context." These controversies are addressed below.
96
89. Id. at 15,114.
90. See Ortiz, supra note 64, at 488 (citing Sections 2, 5, 6, 7, and 10 of the ESA).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (2018).
92. Id. § 1531(a)(5).
93. Id. § 1534(a).
.94. Orton-Palmer, supra note 83, at 9-13. Equally troubling, "[i]n some cases, property owners
might even choose to eliminate or reduce the species' habitat before listing occurs to avoid
liability in the future." Id.
95. Michael Margherita, Candidate Conservation Agreements and ESA Listing Decisions: Underly-
ing Incentives That Drive Stakeholder Behavior, 18 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 570, 579 (2017).
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II. RECOVERY PLANS, DELISTING FACTORS, AND ADEQUATE
REGULATORY MECHANISMS
This Part of the Article considers the nature and requirements of recovery
plans in relation to the ESA's conservation goal. It also addresses delisting fac-
tors, especially Factor D-adequate existing regulatory mechanisms-and sets
the stage for a more in-depth analysis of listing and delisting cases in subse-
quent parts. The overarching species conservation goal of the ESA, which by
any common-sense definition must include within it an objective to maximize
the chances that a recently recovered species will not again require listing under
the Act, is poorly served by existing regulatory approaches. Specifically, as de-
tailed in this section, the recovery plans and post-listing monitoring utilized to
usher a listed species to and through the recovery process too often leave a
recently delisted species inadequately protected and at risk of once again requir-
ing listing under the ESA. This analysis of recovery plans, delisting factors, and
adequate regulatory mechanisms leads to the primary question of this article.
Namely, is there an intermediate step the FWS could take upon delisting to
ensure that adequate mechanisms remain in place for species protection and to
require states and other key players to enforce their regulations while the federal
agencies retain some control over the process? In particular, could something
equivalent to CCAs, utilized to avoid listing a species in the first instance, be
deployed to strengthen the delisting process and bring it more closely into
alignment with the ESA's overall conservation objective? We return to this
question in Part V of this article.
Recovery plans have a complex relationship to the delisting criteria and, in
particular, adequate regulatory mechanisms." Although not originally included
in the ESA, the requirement for recovery plans was codified in 1978.91 Recov-
ery plans are "a basic road map to recovery, i.e., the process that stops or
reverses the decline of a species and neutralizes threats to its existence."99
To the "maximum extent practicable," recovery plans must include three
elements: (1) a description of site-specific management actions that may be
necessary to recover the species; (2) objective and measurable criteria which,
when met, would result in a determination that the species be removed from
the list; and (3) estimates of the time and cost required to carry out those mea-
sures needed to recover the species and to achieve intermediate steps towards
that goal.100 The first and third elements involve a great deal of discretion,'' but
96. See infra Part III.
97. See Daniel J. Rohlf Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act: Top Ten Issues for the Next Thirty
Years, 34 ENvTL. L. 483, 548-49 (2004) (assessing incentives and disincentives behind re-
covery plans and delisting decisions, and identifying inadequacies of existing regulatory
mechanisms in delisting decisions).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).
99. Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 103 (D.D.C. 1995).
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
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the second element, "objective, measurable criteria," places substantive parame-
ters on recovery planning.o2 Notably, the quality of protection-the inclusion
of "legally sufficient risk-management mechanisms to replace the ESA when a
species is delisted"-is more important than the quantity of included criteria.a
3
Not all listed species have recovery plans, despite the central role envi-
sioned for these plans in species recovery.104 Since 1978, 1660 species have been
listed under the ESA.os Of those, 379 eligible species do not have recovery
plans.o6 One reason for this gap is that the ESA grants the FWS authority to
"develop and implement plans for the conservation and survival of endangered
species and threatened species . . . unless he finds that such a plan will not promote
the conservation of the species."'0 The agency's judgment regarding the conserva-
tion benefit of a recovery plan (or lack thereof) receives deference in judicial
review, but it must be reasonable.0 The default expectation in the Act is that a
recovery plan will be created for each listed species.'
09 It is only where the FWS
expressly determines that a recovery plan will not promote conservation of a
species that one need not be created; otherwise, the FWS must develop and
implement a recovery plan for each listed species.110
Another reason that not all listed species have recovery plans is that, since
2009, the number of species listed has outpaced the relatively slow rate of re-
covery plan completion.iii Where the FWS used to take a little over two years
to develop a recovery plan, a contemporary recovery plan takes over five years to
complete, in part due to the increased scientific robustness of a modern recov-
ery plan compared to those created in the past.112 While the improved quality of
modern recovery plans is generally seen as a positive development, this benefit
may be outweighed by the considerable time it takes the FWS to develop and
implement them. In the interim, circumstances for the listed species may and
101. See FundforAnimals, 903 F. Supp. 96 at 106-07 (finding that FWS has discretion to recom-
mend a wide range of "management actions" in developing and implementing recovery plans;
Congress has delegated the authority to make policy choices representing a reasonable ac-
commodation of conflicting policies to the FWS).
102. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
103. Goble, Talk, supra note 12, at 38.
104. Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. 90-4091, 1993 WL 151353, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Feb 1, 1993).
105. Jacob W. Malcolm & Ya-Wei Li, Missing, Delayed and Old: The Status of ESA Recovery
Plans, 11 CONSERVATION LETTERs e12601 (2018).
106. Id.
107. 16 U.S.C § 1533(f) (2018) (emphasis added).
108. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1093 (D. Ariz. 2009)
(finding that FWS's decision not to prepare a recovery plan for the jaguar was inconsistent
with its own guidance and practice).
109. Id.
110. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1151 (N.D.
Cal. 2014).
111. Malcolm & Li, supra note 105.
112. Id.
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often do change significantly, meaning the final recovery plan may reflect an
outdated assessment of the listed species' health and habitat. This limits the
utility of the plan and, in turn, makes recovery an elusive target.13
Even when recovery plans are developed, they are not always followed by
the FWS, which has long maintained that these plans provide nonbinding gui-
dance informing their recovery-based actions on behalf of a listed species,
rather than binding authority that must be followed to the letter.114 Yet the Act
indicates that recovery plans are not just pointless assignments. The ESA com-
pels the FWS to report to Congress every two years "on the status of efforts to
develop and implement recovery plans" for all listed species, and "on the status
of all species for which such plans have been developed.""' There would be no
need for ongoing reports if the FWS were not expected to meet the goals de-
scribed in its recovery plans. "Congress expected the FWS to engage in earnest
and conscientious activity to use the recovery plans to try to remove the species
from the protection of the ESA."11
The end result of a successfil recovery plan is delisting, downlisting, or, at
minimum, survival of the covered species. However, satisfaction of a recovery
plan's goals, while an important consideration in a subsequent decision to delist
or downlist the species, may not be sufficient justification for such a decision."7
And, in at least one case, a delisting decision has been upheld even though the
recovery plan's "objective, measurable criteria" had not been met."8
The relationship between delisting and the satisfaction of "objective, mea-
surable criteria" of a recovery plan was considered by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit in Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar,"' which involved a
challenge to a delisting rule for the West Virginia Flying Squirrel.120 The court
gave deference to the FWS's method for collecting data about the population of
the squirrel, which deviated from the method specified in the recovery plan,
because estimating population numbers across a representative sample of the
113. Id.
114. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
115. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(3) (2018).
116. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1137 n.16 (S.D. Cal.
2006), appeal dismissed, 409 F. App'x 143 (9th Cir. 2011).
117. See Crystal D. Anderson, Reconsidering a Weakened Regulation: A Critical Analysis ofDelisting
in the Endangered Species Act, 9 FLA. A&M U. L. REv. 207, 221 (2013) ("Though recovery
plans are intended to be a road map to species' recovery and have the purpose of helping
bring species to a level where delisting is appropriate, the plans are not always followed,
causing the journey to delisting to be hindered."); see also supra note 37 (discussing the
FWS's removal of "recovery" from its listing regulation).
118. Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(f)).
119. Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
120. Id. at 436.
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entire range of the squirrel "was simply too difficult and too costly."1
21 In keep-
ing with similar holdings from other courts,122 the court characterized recovery
plans as non-binding "statements of intention."1
23 It noted that, while the ESA
states that the Secretary "shall" develop and implement a recovery plan,124 the
ESA also specifically requires the same criteria for delisting a species as the five
factors listed in Section 4(a).125 Although the court conceded that the ESA "is
not entirely clear" regarding "[w]hether an agency must account for a departure
from a prior non-binding statement of intent" found in a recovery plan,1
26 
it
agreed with the FWS that recovery criteria "are predictive of the Service's de-
listing analysis rather than controlling that analysis."1
27 In the end, the court
likened the recovery plan to a map: "although a map may help a traveler chart
his course, it is the sign at the end of the road, here the five statutory factors
indicating recovery, and not a mark on the map that tells him his journey is
over."128
Although a "predictive" recovery plan may not be directly enforceable in
and of itself, the failure to observe its provisions when engaging in consultation
or issuing incidental take permits under the ESA may render the outcome arbi-
121. Id. The method called for in the recovery plan would "require many thousands of nest boxes
and traps" because "squirrels were 'extremely difficult to collect and study.'" Id. at 435.
122. See Friends of the Wild Swan v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 745 F. App'x 718, 721 (9th Cir.
2018) ("The recovery plan does not create any legal rights or obligations for the Service or
any third parties."); Cascadia Wildlands v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 801 F.3d 1105, 1114
n.8 (9th Cir. 2015) ("[The] ESA does not mandate compliance with recovery plans."); Fund
for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 547 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[R]ecovery plans are for
guidance purposes only."); Friends of the Wild Swan v. Thorson, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1338,
1344 (D. Or. 2017), affd, 745 F. App'x 718 (9th Cir. 2018) (highlighting the fact that that
although plans have "real world consequences" they are "non-binding in nature"); Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 389 (D. Wyo. 1993) (refusing to
"second guess the Secretary's motives for not following the recovery plan"). The D.C. Circuit
has consistently followed this reasoning. See Defs. of Wildlife v. Lujan, 792 F. Supp. 834,
835 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that the wolf recovery plan "has never been an action docu-
ment" because it "left open different approaches and contemplated that when an agency or
group made specific proposals for achieving a particular objective of the plan, there would be
a need for further study"); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405, 408 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (upholding FWS's decision to remove endangered condors from the wild despite the
recovery plan's commitment to extensive tracking and study of wild birds).
123. Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 433.
124. Id. at 432-33.
125. See id. at 432-33 ("§ 4(c) makes clear that a decision to delist 'shall be made in accordance'
with the same five factors.") (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a), (c) (2018)).
126. Id. at 435.
127. Id. at 433. The court added, "If the plan is overtaken by events, then there is no need to
change the plan; it may simply be irrelevant." Id. at 434.
128. Id. at 434; see also Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 547 (11th Cir. 1996)
("[R]ecovery plans are for guidance purposes only.").
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trary and capricious, unless the FWS explains why it diverged from the plan.129
By the same token, a failure to consider the plan's provisions, and to explain a
deviation from them, could cause the extinction of the listed species. Thus,
recovery plans are highly relevant to the conservation objective, even if they are
not always enforceable in court.
Upon delisting, the ESA requires the FWS, in cooperation with the rele-
vant state(s), to monitor recovered species for at least five years to assess their
ability to sustain themselves without the ESA's protection.13 0 A draft of the
post-delisting monitoring strategy is made available when the FWS publishes
the delisting proposal in the Federal Register."3 ' If monitoring shows that
threats to the species have changed or unforeseen events have affected the sta-
bility of the species population, the response delineated by the ESA is highly
circumscribed. The FWS may either extend the monitoring period or reinitiate
the listing process for the species.132
In making a decision to delist a species as "recovered," the FWS's determi-
nation regarding the adequacy of existing regulations (other than the ESA it-
self) is closely tied to the threats listed in Section 4(a).11 In assessing and
managing the risk to the species, the FWS must address both the threats that
prompted the listing in the first place as well as new threats that may have
emerged since listing.13 4
Returning to Friends ofBlackwater v. Salazar, the plaintiffs argued that the
FWS should analyze the adequacy of regulatory mechanisms independently of
the possible threats to the West Virginia Flying Squirrel.'35 The D.C. Circuit
disagreed, noting that "having considered all the other types of threats listed in
§ 4(a)(1) and found no existing conditions such as disease or destruction of
129. See Sw. Ctr. For Biological Diversityv. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2006),
appeal dismissed, 409 F. App'x 143 (9th Cir. 2011) (remanding an incidental take permit
because its terms were inconsistent with the recovery plan); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Babbitt,
128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1283 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (placing weight on recovery plan provisions
for an endangered snake in evaluating the merits of the Natomas Basin Habitat Conserva-
tion Plan); c Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 931 F.3d 339, 358-60 (4th Cir.
2019) (concluding FWS's reliance on vague and outdated data in a recovery plan to justify its
finding that the endangered clubshell would not be jeopardized by a pipeline was arbitrary).
But see Cascadia Wildlands v. Thrailkill, 806 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that
FWS was not obligated to follow or explain its departure from spotted owl recovery plans
when rendering a jeopardy opinion under Section 7, because the opinion properly focused on
jeopardy rather than on perfect compliance with recovery plans, and recovery and jeopardy
are "two distinct concepts").
130. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(g)(1).
131. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DELISTING A SPECIEs: SECTION 4 OF THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT 2 (2011), https://perma.cc/VYX3-5SDM.
132. Id.
133. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E).
134. Goble, Talk, supra note 12, at 42.
135. 691 F.3d 428, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the court's treatment of the recovery plan and delisting decision for the squirrel).
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habitat threatened the subspecies, the Service could reasonably, indeed readily,
conclude the squirrel did not require additional regulatory protection.1
36 Fur-
ther, if the adequacy of regulations were to be judged in a vacuum, "without
considering the level, or even the existence, of any threat the regulation is de-
signed to meet, then it would follow that the Service could never delist a spe-
cies."137 According to the court, this would result in "an absurd overabundance
of regulation."'3 8
This decision and the Service's current all-or-nothing stance on post-list-
ing monitoring reflect an approach to recovery that fails to recognize the salu-
tary potential of a more active approach to collaborative federal, state, and
private engagement in the recovery of newly-delisted species. As discussed in
Part V of this article, rather than passively monitoring the viability of a newly
delisted species and intervening only when recovery has failed, the Service
should utilize the engaged and active multiparty approach to implementing reg-
ulatory measures to improve a species' welfare used in successful pre-listing
conservation agreements. To understand this approach, where, how, and why it
has worked in the pre-listing context, and how it could be extended to the post-
listing recovery phase, we examine several illustrative pre-listing examples of
CCAs in the next Part.
III. THE USE OF REGULATORY MECHANISMS IN CCAs
To AvoID LISTING
In the nearly half century of its existence, the ESA and its dense statutory
language (to say nothing of the tomes of Byzantine regulations and policies
created to effectuate its purposes) have been fodder for countless academic pa-
pers on the law, policy, and science of species protection. Many of these papers
have wrestled with the difficult task of making sense of the Act's requirements
and seeking solutions to its shortcomings that remain true to its conservation
goal while being palatable to parties with a more pro-development bent.
Of course, this dynamic remains true today, though with an enhanced ur-
gency. In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the deleterious im-
pacts of climate change on the continued viability of species has moved from a
theoretical to an existential threat. Simply put, the extinction of species world-
wide has reached crisis proportions, with species loss at nearly one thousand
times the historical background of two species per year.'
39 The United States,
136. Id.
137. Id. (emphasis added). When the squirrel was listed, population declines were attributed to
forest clearing and other human disturbances. Id. at 430. In its delisting rule, FWS found
that "monitoring data provide[d] strong evidence of [its] continued presence" throughout
80% of its range, and that "habitat trends [were] moving in a positive direction in terms of
forest regeneration and conservation." Id. at 431.
138. Id. at 436.
139. Ceballos et al., supra note 1, at 114.
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long a beacon of species conservation for the world to follow with a robust slate
of federal and state wildlife conservation laws, is not immune from this crisis.
The scope and scale of this threat puts even greater importance on the
delisting process for formerly threatened and endangered species. The FWS
cannot afford to allow newly recovered species to slip back into danger because
of inadequate post-listing protections. Federal and state resources devoted to
species conservation are extremely unlikely to expand in proportion to the ever-
growing demand as more and more species qualify for ESA listing. Even put-
ting aside the question of moral and ethical duties owed to these newly-recov-
ered species, rational resource allocation and sound financial practices argue for
more investment in shoring up post-listing protections, which are compara-
tively cheaper than the long-term costs associated with relisting a species.'"'
The exact nature of these additional investments is, as with seemingly all mat-
ters touching the ESA, a matter of some debate. What is beyond debate, how-
ever, is that as we near the close of the second decade of the twenty-first
century on a rapidly warming planet, the time has come to transition from
generalized discussion to an actionable plan to improve post-listing outcomes.
A logical starting point for this transition is to apply, with appropriate modifi-
cations, the conservation agreement approach used to keep a species from being
listed in the first place to newly-recovered species to keep them from requiring
relisting.
The FWS has successfully utilized CCAs to avoid listing a species in a
number of cases. However, not all CCAs provide adequate regulatory mecha-
nisms to avoid listing. This Part examines the use of CCAs to avoid listing the
Barton Springs Salamander, west coast steekhead populations, Arctic grayling,
and greater sage-grouse. Our discussion of the first two species is brief because
the take-away lesson is relatively straightforward-proposed future measures
are not adequate if the species requires immediate intervention. The latter two
species demonstrate more nuanced and complex concepts, and accordingly they
are given more in-depth treatment. Part IV shifts to the delisting process, and
considers whether utilizing strategies similar to CCAs in the delisting context
could facilitate recovery.
A. Salamanders and Steelhead
Courts generally agree that the FWS may not rely on prospective conser-
vation actions in a CCA to avoid listing an imperiled species if listing is other-
wise appropriate.14 1 In Save Our Springs v. Babbitt,142 a federal district court
140. See John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1171, 1186 n.48 (1998) (provid-
ing estimates of costs for the process of listing, recovery, and delisting species); Orton-
Palmer, supra note 83, at 9-13.
141. See Desert Survivors v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1075 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (future conservation efforts were not sufficiently certain to improve the status of the
Bi-State sage grouse); In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & 4(d) Rule Litig.,
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found that a decision not to list the Barton Springs salamander was arbitrary,
despite the State of Texas's agreement to implement 28 conservation actions in
a CCA.143 The CCA contained relatively vague words such as "identify," "eval-
uate," "review," and "work with," and failed to "take any tangible steps to reduce
the immediate threat to the species," even if the CCA were to be fully imple-
mented.144 As for the CCA's description of "possible future actions of the State
of Texas to protect the species," the court found that the FWS "cannot use
promises of proposed future actions as an excuse for not making a [listing]
determination based on the existing record."1
45
Similarly, a California district court in Federation of Fly Fishers v. Daleyl
46
found that reliance on prospective measures set forth in a steelhead conserva-
tion agreement was "inconsistent with the aggressive preventive posture of the
ESA because '[tihere are no assurances that the measures will be carried out,
when they will be carried out, nor whether they will be effective in eliminating
the threats to the species.' "147 The court noted that some courts had found that
the FWS can rely on a CCA despite its provisions being "newly imple-
mented,"141 but that is a far cry from relying on prospective actions that may
never be implemented.149 The former provides a definite and measurable, albeit
new, protection to the species, while the latter is conditional and uncertain. In
particular, the court found that where "adequate State funding is critical" to
effectuate the conservation agreement, mere "commitments to seek such fund-
794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 113 n.56 (D.D.C. 2011), affd, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("[T]he
ESA does not permit FWS to consider speculative future conservation actions."); Trout Un-
limited v. Lohn, 645 F. Supp. 2d 929, 956-57 (D. Or. 2007) (emphasis added)
("[A]ssumptions about the future effect of Oregon Plan proposed measures . . . cannot be
relied upon."); Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1154 (D. Or. 1998)
("NMFS may only consider conservation efforts that are currently operational."); Sw. Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 939 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D.D.C. 1996) ("promises of pro-
posed future actions [are not] an excuse" for not listing); see also Colorado v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 362 F. Supp. 3d 951, 981 (D. Colo. 2018) (affirming a listing decision where
the CCA relied on future measures when, "[w]ithout some indication of who would enroll
and the measures they would select, there were no numbers, projections, or proposed efforts
for the Service to evaluate"). But see Permian Basin Petroleum Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior,
127 F. Supp. 3d 700 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (faulting FWS for failing to project future funding
and future enrollment in a CCA when it listed the lesser prairie chicken).
142. Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d 739 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
143. Id. at 748.
144. Id. at 744.
145. Id. at 747.
146. 131 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
147. Id. at 1165 (quoting Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 744).
148. Id. at 1166 (quoting Defs. of Wildlife v. Babbitt, No. 97-CV-2330, 1999 WL 33537981
(S.D. Cal. June 14, 1999), rev'd sub nom. Defs. of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
149. Id. at 1169.
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ing" did not justify a decision that listing was not warranted, especially when no
funding "had been definitively earmarked toward realizing [California's] com-
mitments."1so Read together, these cases show a clear judicial unwillingness to
accept platitudes in place of required action in conservation agreements.
B. Arctic Grayling
Arctic grayling (Thymallus arcticus) are native to far north drainages of the
Arctic Ocean, Hudson Bay, and the Northern Pacific Ocean. Two distinct
populations historically inhabited clear, cold waters in Michigan and Montana,
but the Michigan population has been extinct since the early 19 00 s.11 Arctic
grayling are still present in Montana, though there has been a significant de-
cline in their range and abundance due to riparian habitat destruction and cur-
tailment. The remaining twenty Arctic grayling populations reside in the Upper
Missouri River Basin. "Two of them-the Big Hole River and Ennis Reser-
voir/Madison River populations-are located primarily on private land, while
the remaining eighteen are found primarily on federal land."152
In 2010, the FWS considered the status of the Arctic grayling and found
that listing was "warranted but precluded" by higher priority actions."s' The
2010 finding identified a variety of significant threats to the Arctic grayling,
including low stream flows and high stream temperatures, present and
threatened destruction of its habitat, and climate change.15 4
In 2014, FWS reversed course and determined that listing the Arctic gray-
ling was not warranted.'s In deciding not to list the grayling, the FWS relied in
150. Id. at 1167-68; see also Rocky Mountain Wild v. Walsh, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1253 (D.
Colo. 2016) (invalidating FWS's withdrawal of its proposed listing of beardtongue wild-
flowers when FWS concluded less than one year previously in its proposed listing that ex-
isting regulatory mechanisms were not adequate, and when references to future regulatory
mechanisms did not show how previously identified regulatory gaps had been filled).
151. Dani Knoph, What Will it Take for Michigan's Wild Arctic Grayling to Return Home?, MY-
NoRTH (May 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/AE73-DA59. The last reported native Arctic
grayling in Michigan was caught in 1936 on the Otter River in the Upper Peninsula. Id.
152. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018).
153. Revised 12-Month Finding to List the Upper Missouri River Distinct Population Segment
of Arctic Grayling as Endangered or Threatened, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,708 (Sept. 8, 2010) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17), [hereinafter 2010 Arctic Grayling Finding]. FWS initially
considered whether to list the arctic grayling in 1982, determining that listing was "possibly
appropriate," but deciding not to list due to a lack of sufficient data. Review of Vertebrate
Wildlife for Listing as Endangered or Threatened Species, 47 Fed. Reg. 58,454, 58,454
(Dec. 30, 1982).
154. 2010 Arctic Grayling Finding, supra note 153, at 54,715, 54,728.
155. Revised 12-Month Finding on a Petition to List the Upper Missouri River Distinct Popula-
tion Segment of Arctic Grayling as an Endangered or Threatened Species, 79 Fed. Reg.
49,384, 49,384 (Aug. 20, 2014) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter 2014 Arctic
Grayling Finding].
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large part on the Big Hole River CCAA.156 The Big Hole River CCAA, which
was adopted in 2006, covers over 158,000 acres within the Big Hole manage-
ment area.15 It is intended to remove barriers to grayling migration through
fish ladders, streamflows, and other means of facilitating connectivity of cold-
water streams, to reduce entrainment threats, and to improve and protect the
function of riparian habitats.ss Thirty-one private landowners agreed to partici-
pate in the CCAA.159
Environmental petitioners challenged the FWS's decision on several
grounds, including the lack of adequate regulatory mechanisms.160 They argued
that the FWS's reliance on voluntary conservation efforts in the Big Hole
CCAA was inappropriate, and that removing the grayling from its status as a
candidate for listing eradicated any reason for more landowners to sign the
CCAA.16 1 The district court disagreed, highlighting the evidence in the record
that the CCAA had a positive impact on the Big Hole Arctic grayling
habitat.'62 Further, the court saw no evidence in the record that "at some un-
specified point in the future the agreement itself or its participants will disap-
pear."'63 It also found that the 2014 decision provided "an exhaustive list of each
state and federal regulatory mechanism, and how it protects the Arctic
grayling."164
When the petitioners appealed, the State of Montana highlighted its ef-
forts to confront threats to the Arctic grayling by addressing "low stream flows,
degraded riparian habitat, entrainment in irrigation ditches, and barriers to
grayling migration."'65 Specifically, the Big Hole CCAA requires participating
landowners to comply with water rights, reduce irrigation withdrawals, and im-
prove irrigation management.'6 6 Montana argued that these provisions facilitate
156. Id. at 49,400.
157. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Jewell, No. 15-CV-4, 2016 WL 4592199, at *7 (D. Mont
Sept. 2, 2016), rev'd in part sub nom. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053,
1059 (9th Cir. 2018).
158. 2014 Arctic Grayling Finding, supra note 155, at 49,402.
159. Id. at 49,407. Although most of the Arctic grayling populations in the Upper Missouri River
occur on federal land, the Big Hole River population occurs on primarily (90 percent) private
land. Id. at 49,400. The CCAA implements a broader Habitat Conservation Plan for the
grayling, which includes federal participants. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 900 F.3d at 1062.
160. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2016 WL 4592199 at *8.
161. Id. at *3.
162. Id. at *7.
163. Id. The court also found that the species was "responding positively to the existing condi-
tions in conjunction with voluntary conservation efforts." Id. at *8.
164. Id. at *8.
165. Brief of Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee State of Montana & Montana Department of Fish
Wildlife & Parks at 7, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2017)
(No. 16-35866), 2017 WL 2493502, at *7 (describing Montana's Arctic Grayling Recovery
Program and the Big Hole CCAA).
166. Id.
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recovery by connecting 98% of the core grayling habitat, increasing stream-
flows, and decreasing water temperature.'7
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, and found that the Big Hole
CCAA could not "save the agency's flawed 2014 Finding." 6' According to the
court, Montana's efforts to improve fish passage through fish ladders and other
means "would be of little value if the water in the tributaries is still too
warm."'69 The FWS also failed to explain why it had reversed course so dramat-
ically since its earlier finding in 2010, when the FWS concluded that regulatory
mechanisms did not adequately protect the species,170 and that the CCAA
would reduce but not eliminate threats of dewatering.171 The Ninth Circuit
noted that, while minimum flow targets had been achieved 78 percent of the
time since the CCAA's measures took effect, that was not sufficient to avoid
listing because the FWS had previously stated that the flow target represented
minimum values to promote recovery of the Arctic grayling.17 2
Since the Ninth Circuit's decision, the FWS, the State of Montana, and
other potential cooperating parties such as counties and conservation organiza-
tions have drafted a CCAA for the Centennial Valley population of the Arctic
grayling. As with the Big Hole CCAA, Montana will take a lead role in imple-
menting and enforcing the CCAA's provisions related to landowner enroll-
ment, fish entrainment surveys, instream flow plans, data collection,
negotiation and implementation of site-specific conservation plans, and en-
forcement of participants' water rights.73 For its part, the FWS will ensure that
the CCAA's terms and conditions are being implemented and will work with
the agencies and participating landowners to resolve compliance issues.174 the
FWS has not yet issued a revised delisting rule,'7 ' but the coordinated, sus-
167. Id. at *7-8.
168. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 900 F.3d at 1070.
169. Id. at 1071.
170. Id. at 1070.
171. Id. at 1070 n.16.
172. Id. The Ninth Circuit also found that the FWS arbitrarily ignored credible scientific evi-
dence that the Big Hole grayling population was decreasing. Id. at 1069.
173. See Candidate Conservation Agreement With Assurances for Arctic Grayling in the
Centennial Valley, Montana Between Montana Dept. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks and U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv. 21-22, 41 (Jan. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/X9EY-ZKNT. Site spe-
cific plans are habitat conservation plans "specific to an enrolled property and designed to
address the conservation needs of Arctic grayling as well as the needs of the landowner." Id.
at 2. They complement the Enhancement of Survival Permit issued to Montana in associa-
tion with the CCAA under ESA Section 10(a)(1)(A), which authorizes specified "take" of
the species resulting from CCAA implementation and associated land uses. See id. at 1, 41.
174. Id at 42.
175. See Patrick Reilly, FWP Takes Comments on Grayling Reintroduction, MIssouLuArN (Feb. 6,
2020), https://perma.cc/HDG5-2XA5 (reporting that the FWS faces a July 2020 deadline
for its proposed listing decision).
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tained, cooperative efforts between the state, other collaborators, and the FWS
are notable. Even so, it is not clear whether the species can recover in the face
of climate change and warming stream temperatures, despite extensive conser-
vation measures.'6
C. Greater Sage-Grouse
One well-publicized example of the use of conservation agreements to
avoid listing involves the greater sage-grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus). 
77 The
greater sage-grouse inhabits sagebrush landscapes in eleven western states and
two Canadian provinces."' It is sometimes described as an "umbrella species"
for the wide variety of plants and animals that occupy the same sagebrush
steppe landscape.17 9 An umbrella species is one whose population health is a
bellwether for other similarly situated species. In the case of the greater sage-
grouse, conservation efforts that benefit its long-term viability are also likely to
benefit the hundreds of plants and animals occupying the same ecosystem.1s
0
Male sage-grouse are known for performing elaborate, days-long commu-
nal mating dances on leks, sparsely vegetated patches of breeding ground spe-
cifically chosen by the male for optimum viewing opportunities for females.
Nesting sites are often located near leks, which appear to be selected at least in
part based on their distance from significant human land disturbances from
agriculture and other development activities."'
Protecting the sagebrush ecosystem is of particular importance to the
health of greater sage-grouse populations, which as a "sagebrush obligate" spe-
cies requires large expanses of undisturbed and healthy sagebrush to thrive. To-
day, greater sage-grouse occupy approximately 56 percent of the range they
occupied in 1800, prior to white settlers arriving in the western United States.1
2
176. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 900 F.3d at 1059, 1071.
177. See Justin R. Pidot, Public-Private Conservation Agreements and the Greater Sage-Grouse, 39
PUB. LAND & Rrs. L. REV. 161, 198 (2018) (expressing optimism that "collaboration and
compromise aimed at achieving both increased economic and ecological certainty is
possible").
178. 12-Month Finding on a Petition To List Greater Sage-Grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus)
as an Endangered or Threatened Species, 80 Fed. Reg. 59,858, 59,864 (Oct. 2, 2015) [here-
inafter 2015 Sage-Grouse Findings].
179. Audubon Editors, Umbrella Species: Greater Sage Grouse, AUDUBON MAG. (Mar.-Apr.
2013), https://perma.cc/Z8B6-SUWL.
180. Id.
181. See Steven T. Knick, Steven E. Hanser & Kristine L. Preston, Modeling Ecological Minimum
Requirements for Distribution of Greater Sage-Grouse Leks: Implications for Population Connec-
tivity Across their Western Range, U.S.A., 3 ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 1539, 1545 (2013)
(finding that 99 percent of active leks were located in areas with less than 3 percent of
human disturbance of the land within a 5 kilometer radius of the lek).
182. 2015 Sage-Grouse Findings, supra note 178, at 59,864.
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This habitat loss, coupled with fragmentation of the sagebrush habitat that re-
mains, has had a profound impact, causing a significant reduction in greater
sage-grouse populations."' The fragmentation of what was once a contiguous
greater sage-grouse range encompassing over 460,000 square miles led to the
current conservation efforts being conducted in seven separate management
zones located across the West.18 4
In 2010, the FWS found that rangewide, sage-grouse were experiencing a
long-term decline in abundance from habitat loss and fragmentation, primarily
caused by energy and infrastructure development, agriculture and grazing, ur-
banization, invasive plants, wildfire, and climate change.'5 The picture the
FWS painted of the greater sage-grouse's prospects was grim: "Overall, the
range of the species is now characterized by numerous relatively small popula-
tions existing in a patchy mosaic of increasingly fragmented habitat, with di-
minished connectivity.""6 The FWS found that sagebrush restoration
techniques utilized at the time were "limited and generally ineffective," provid-
ing little hope for a reversal of habitat loss in the future."' In fact, the FWS
opined that the best science available pointed to a bleak future for the greater
sage-grouse, driven by continued habitat loss and fragmentation, marked by
"reduced abundance and further isolation . . . increasing their vulnerability to
extinction.""' Given this litany of bad news, it is unsurprising that the FWS
ultimately found that listing the greater sage-grouse rangewide as threatened or
endangered under the ESA was warranted."' However, the FWS also deter-
mined that listing at that time was precluded by higher priority listing
actions.190
The 2010 warranted-but-precluded finding came on the heels of a suc-
cessful challenge to a previous status review that determined that listing the
sage-grouse was not warranted.' A federal district court vacated that finding
because (1) the FWS failed to utilize the best science available in reaching its
finding, and (2) politically-motivated interference by the FWS's deputy assis-
tant secretary in the listing analysis "to steer the 'best science' to a pre-ordained
outcome" independently justified a conclusion that the finding was arbitrary
183. See id. at 59,867.
184. Id. at 59,864-65.
185. See 12-Month Findings for Petitions to List the Greater Sage-Grouse, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,909,
13,986 (Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Sage-Grouse Findings].
186. Id. at 13,988.
187. Id. at 13,986 ("[T]he destruction and modification of habitat has been substantial in many
areas across the range of the species, it is ongoing, and it will continue or even increase in the
future.").
188. Id.
189. Id. at 13,988.
190. Id.




and capricious.19 2 While it did not specifically mention this reputational black
eye in the 2010 finding, the FWS did acknowledge that its "understanding of
the status of the species and the threats affecting it has changed substantially
since our decision in 2005."111
In making its 2010 determination that listing the greater sage-grouse
across its range was warranted, the FWS specifically noted the lack of adequate
regulatory mechanisms at the local or state levels.194 At the local level, the FWS
found little in the way of regulatory mechanisms that provided direct or indirect
protections to the sage-grouse or its habitat.195 State-level protections were
found to be similarly lacking, limited in most states to hunting limits and other
measures that provided "little or no protection to greater sage-grouse
habitat."'96 Protections for greater sage-grouse and its habitat on federal land
were stronger on balance.197 However, the FWS noted a significant variation
across the sage-grouse's range in the adoption and implementation of conserva-
tion measures by these agencies.199
The FWS summarized its review of existing regulatory mechanisms by
concluding that, not only were they inadequate, they posed a significant threat
to the greater sage-grouse "now and in the foreseeable future." 19 9 Although the
2010 finding made note of existing public-private conservation efforts for the
sage-grouse and its habitat, describing them as effective in limited geographic
areas, the FWS found that these efforts were "neither individually nor collec-
tively at a scale that is sufficient to ameliorate threats to the species or popula-
tions."200 Interestingly, in light of the significant impact of the multi-party sage-
grouse conservation effort that was to come, the FWS concluded its analysis by
noting that, while it was aware of other conservation efforts being planned,
there was "substantial uncertainty as to whether, where, and when they will be
implemented, and whether they will be effective."2 01
A series of lawsuits filed by environmental plaintiffs followed the FWS's
2010 warranted-but-precluded greater sage-grouse finding. WildEarth Guardi-
192. See W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1185, 1188-89 (D.
Idaho 2007).
193. 2010 Sage-Grouse Findings, supra note 185, at 13,987.
194. See id.
195. See id. The FWS stated "(T]o our knowledge, no current local land use or development
planning regulations provide adequate protection to sage-grouse from development or other
harmful land uses. Development and fragmentation of private lands is a threat to greater
sage-grouse (see discussion under Factor A), and current local regulations do not adequately
address this threat." Id. at 13,982.




200. Id. at 13,988.
201. Id.
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ans and the Center for Biological Diversity, along with other environmental
groups, had spent he previous decade submitting hundreds of petitions to list
as endangered or threatened a myriad of species.202 The FWS's failure to take
action on many of these petitions within ESA statutory deadlines, along with
its "parking" of hundreds of candidate species in warranted but precluded status
where they received no protection under the ESA, formed the basis of these
lawsuits.203 In 2011, the FWS entered settlement agreements to resolve the liti-
gation.20 In exchange for a commitment from the plaintiffs to slow the pace of
their listing petitions and to forebear from filing additional petition deadline
litigation, the FWS agreed to speed up its review of existing petitions and to
issue proposed listing or not warranted findings for 251 candidate species, in-
cluding completing its review of the greater sage-grouse by no later than
2015.205
Spurred by this deadline, and newly motivated by the specter of ESA-
imposed restrictions on public and private uses of sage-grouse habitat should
the bird be listed, a coalition of federal and state agencies, private landowners,
and conservation groups mounted a massive movement to put in place regula-
tory measures sufficient to avoid listing.206 The expected impacts of listing on
ranchers, energy developers, mining companies, and other users of western
sagebrush lands were dramatic. Were the FWS to list the sage-grouse across its
historic range, 173 million acres would have been subject to ESA protections;
roughly 45-percent of sage-grouse habitat includes private lands, so listing
could have drastically curtailed ranching and other interests.2 07 With this back-
drop, the parties who had previously struggled to compromise reached agree-
ment on the need to strike an appropriate regulatory balance between
protecting greater sage-grouse habitat and populations on the one hand and
allowing for continued economic uses of that habitat on the other.
Given the number of interested parties, the conservation effort that re-
sulted was necessarily multipronged, complex, and wide-ranging. Among its
federal components were amendments to land use plans that forbade BLM and
the Forest Service from granting new authorizations to applicants whose pro-
posed activities would disturb sage-grouse habitat unless compensatory mitiga-
tion efforts would "more than fully offset those impacts,"20s and new
202. See Pidot, supra note 177, at 189.
203. See In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1369
(J.P.M.L. 2010).
204. Pidot, supra note 177, at 189.
205. Id.
206. Joshua Zaffos, Conservation Agreements Try to Head Off Species Listings, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (June 1, 2012), https://perma.cc/7PHT-ND5H.
207. Press Release, Jessica Kershaw, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Historic Conservation Campaign
Protects Greater Sage-Grouse (Sept. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/3PRX-9VMA.
208. See Pidot, supra note 177, at 186.
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Department of the Interior rangeland wildfire management rules to protect the
ecosystem relied on by greater sage-grouse.209 In addition, the Sage Grouse Ini-
tiative, led by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Natural Resources Conser-
vation Service, worked with landowners on voluntary sage-grouse conservation
efforts such as conservation easements, which resulted in restoration or conser-
vation of over four million acres of critical sage-grouse habitat on privately-
owned land.210 As for the states, ten of the eleven with greater sage-grouse
populations updated their state-level sage-grouse management plans.
2 1
1 Finally,
the FWS used CCAAs and CCAs extensively, securing commitments from
numerous landowners to engage in activities that protect greater sage-grouse
habitat (or forbear from activities harmful to sage-grouse habitat) on millions of
acres of non-Federal lands.212
In 2015, when the FWS next considered listing the greater sage-grouse, it
found that these landscape-scale conservation efforts had sufficiently reduced
the threat such that listing was no longer warranted.2
13 The FWS made a point
of emphasizing the key role that sage-grouse CCAs on private property played
in its determination, writing that, in conjunction with new federal and state
regulatory measures, they represented "a substantial increase in sage-grouse
conservation since 2010 [that] provide conservation for sage-grouse now and
into the future and ensure that the most important habitats will remain distrib-
uted across the landscape to support the populations identified as critical to the
long-term conservation of the species."
2 14
However, the coalition behind the extensive public-private conservation
efforts has begun to fray under the Trump Administration. In 2017, the BLM
issued a notice of intent to amend land use plans in the greater sage-grouse
conservation area.215 The BLM then issued records of decision on the proposed
amendments in March 2019.216 After nearly a decade of partnership building
209. 2015 Sage-Grouse Findings, supra note 178, at 59,896.
210. See Kershaw, supra note 207.
211. 2015 Sage-Grouse Findings, supra note 178, at 59,873.
212. See id. at 59,886 ("As an example, landowners enrolled in the Oregon CCAA have agreed to
maintain contiguous habitat by avoiding further fragmentation. The objective for this re-
quired conservation measure is for no net loss in: (1) Habitat quantity (as measured in acres)
and (2) habitat quality (as determined by the ecological state). Additionally, every enrolled
landowner must have at least one conservation measure in place to address each threat iden-
tified during the baseline assessment of individual properties.").
213. See id. at 59,887 ("Since 2010, there have been several major changes in the regulatory mech-
anisms that minimize impacts to sage-grouse and their habitats.").
214. Id.
215. Notice of Intent to Amend Land Use Plans Regarding Greater Sage-Grouse Conservation
and Prepare Associated Environmental Impact Statements or Environmental Assessments,
82 Fed. Reg. 47,248 (Oct. 11, 2017).
216. Notice of Intent to Amend the Greater Sage-Grouse Resource Management Plan Revisions and
Amendment(s), BuREAu OF LAND MGMT., https://perma.cc/5EZN-E64C.
2020] Species Conservation 397
Harvard Environmental Law Review
between private landowners, western states, and federal agencies, these amend-
ments signal a weakening of the BLM's commitment to holding up its side of
the groundbreaking sage-grouse conservation bargain.217 While couched in lan-
guage of compromise and conservation, the BLM's description of its motiva-
tion for issuing these amendments indicates a desire to open sage-grouse
habitat to more recreational and industrial uses, weighting the balance between
conservation and use in sagebrush landscapes in favor of use.218
Even with signs of federal retreat from the shared conservation commit-
ments that form the backbone of the public-private sage-grouse coalition, by
some measures the coalition was a resounding success.2 19 Beyond the obvious
achievement of putting in place commitments to preserve greater sage-grouse
and their habitat sufficient to avoid listing, it also showed a potential way for-
ward for conserving other imperiled species through utilizing conservation
agreements on private lands in conjunction with coordinated state and federal
efforts that could also prove useful in the delisting process, as discussed in Part
V.
IV. ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE REGULATORY MECHANISMS
IN THE DELISTING CONTEXT
When it comes to recovery and delisting, "a particularly nettlesome" factor
is "the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms" for the listed species.220
To warrant delisting, the regulatory situation must have improved significantly
since the listing decision, at least for those species that were imperiled in part
by a lack of adequate legal protections regarding habitat conservation, degrada-
tion, or other significant threats. Moreover, in making a delisting decision, as
Professor Goble observed, the analysis "necessarily must include an evaluation
of the risk management that will be available if the species were delisted."221
Not only must the FWS find that the species is no longer at risk, but it must
also find that removing the ESA's protection will not place the species again at
217. See id.
218. See BLM Greater Sage-Grouse Plans, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://perma.cc/239W-
WE9A ("Increased access to public lands and resources ensures shared stewardship of sage-
brush landscapes to benefit wildlife and recreation and support local economies.")
219. Challenges to development in sage-grouse habitat previously covered by the initiative are
pending. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, W. Watersheds Project v. Zinke, No. 01:18-cv-187 (D.
Idaho Apr. 30, 2018), 2018 WL 2015857 at ¶ 11 (claiming that the "BLM has offered and
sold-without prior review or analysis of site-specific and cumulative impacts to greater sage-
grouse populations and habitat-hundreds of thousands of acres of oil and gas leases within or
affecting sage-grouse habitats designated in the Sage-Grouse Plan Amendments" in viola-
tion of "Sage-Grouse Plan Amendments' provisions and requirements, including that oil and
gas leasing be prioritized outside sage-grouse habitats").
220. Rohlf, supra note 97, at 547-48.
221. Goble, Talk, supra note 12, at 16.
398 [Vol. 44
risk. "In other words, is the ESA all that is preventing the species' downward
spiral into extinction?"222
In theory, at least, the delisting process should be somewhat less difficult
than the listing process. One key difference between the listing and delisting
processes is the quantity and quality of data available to the decision-maker.
The amount of information known about a species when it is proposed for
listing often pales in comparison to the large body of information on the species
and the management actions that have proven successful in recovering the spe-
cies available for review in the delisting process.
223
As we look at these important delisting cases, we consider whether strate-
gies similar to CCAs may translate to the delisting process and if so how they
might improve the delisting process to bring it closer into alignment with the
ESA's conservation goal. The conservation incentives provided in CCAs and
CCAAs are designed to promote the recovery of the threatened or endangered
species, albeit somewhat indirectly.224 A commitment to continue the regulatory
mechanisms found in an applicable CCA or CCAA for a listed species may
both support a delisting decision and facilitate the continued recovery of the
species post-delisting.225 In its PECE policy, the FWS acknowledged that the
recovery plan is more appropriate for providing guidance for delisting, in com-
parison to CCAs and CCAAs.226 However, the FWS encouraged the develop-
ment of CCAs and CCAAs "even if they will not be completed prior to a final
222. Id. See Holly Doremus, Delisting Under the ESA: An Aspirational Goal, Not a Realistic Expec-
tation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,434, 10,446 (2000) (arguing that many species have no protec-
tion outside the ESA, and such species "are likely to need the special protections of the ESA
forever"); Federico Cheever, The Rhetoric of Delisting Under the ESA: How to Declare Victory
Without Winning the War, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,302, 11,306 (2001) (noting that the notion
that ESA can keep species away from the brink of extinction so they require no further
protection "implies that once the magic delisting level has been achieved, species habitat may
be destroyed and species members killed without any legal ramifications. For the vast major-
ity of species, this notion is a complete delusion").
223. Goble, Talk, supra note 12, at 16.
224. PECE, supra note 85, at 15,107.
225. See id. at 15,102 ("If we receive new information . . . after we have decided to list a species,
then we will consider this new information along with other measures that reduce threats to
the species and may use this information in downlisting . . . or delisting. However, PECE
will not control our analysis of the downlisting of the species.").
226. Id.; see also supra Part II (discussing non-binding nature of recovery plans). The FWS seems
to have backed away from this position with its new 2019 regulations, which, among other
things, eliminated species recovery as a reason for delisting. Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84
Fed. Reg. 45,020 (Aug. 27, 2019) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(e)). Seventeen states and
several other plaintiffs have challenged the new regulations, arguing that this revision is
contrary to 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b) & (c), 1532(3), 1533(f), and 1536(a)(1) of the ESA. First
Amended Complaint at 43, California v. Bernhardt, 4:19-cv-06013 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22,
2019).
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listing decision," because the agreements "could serve as the foundation . . . for
a recovery plan, and could lead to earlier recovery and delisting."22 7
A. Great Lakes Gray Wolf
The adequacy of state regulatory mechanisms in the delisting context was
questioned in a high-profile case involving western Great Lakes gray wolves. By
the mid-twentieth century, gray wolves had been hunted, trapped, and
poisoned to near extinction throughout the lower 48 states. The timber wolf
(Canis lupus lycaon) was given federal protection in 1967,228 followed by the
Northern Rocky Mountain wolf (Canis lupus irremotus) in 1973.221 Some popu-
lations began to rebound, and a successful reintroduction effort in the Greater
Yellowstone region, undertaken pursuant to a recovery plan, enhanced the via-
bility of the Rocky Mountain wolves.2 30 After a barrage of litigation and con-
gressional intervention, the Rocky Mountain populations were delisted, and the
FWS turned its attention to the Great Lakes populations. Its attempt to delist
those populations has been decidedly checkered.2 3 '
In 2011, after two successful legal challenges to its previous delisting
rules,232 the FWS issued yet another rule to delist the western Great Lakes gray
wolf 23 3 This rule proposed to revise the listing of the gray wolf by expanding a
distinct population segment ("DPS") of Great Lakes gray wolves to eight states
227. PECE, supra note 85, at 15,114.
228. Endangered Species, 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (March 11, 1967).
229. Amendments to Lists of Endangered Fish and Wildlife, 38 Fed. Reg. 14,678 (June 4, 1973).
The remaining two populations, the Mexican wolf (Canis lupus baileyi) and the Texas wolf
(Canis lupus monstrabilis), were added to the list in 1976. Determination That Two Species
of Butterflies Are Endangered Species and Two Species of Mammals Are Endangered Spe-
cies, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,736, 17,737 (April 28, 1976); Endangered Status for 159 Taxa of
Animals, 41 Fed. Reg. 24,062, 24,066 (June 14, 1976).
230. For details, see Martha Williams, Lessons from the Wolf Wars: Recovery v. Delisting Under the
Endangered Species Act, 27 FoRDHAum ENVTL. L. REv. 106, 131-42 (2015).
231. See, e.g., Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Kempthorne, 579 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2008)
(vacating a Western Great Lakes delisting rule for "fail[ing] to acknowledge and address
crucial statutory ambiguities" concerning the creation of distinct population segments for the
purpose of delisting); Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Zinke, 865 F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(vacating a Western Great Lakes deisting rule and detailing the regulatory and litigation
history).
232. See Final Rule to Reclassify and Remove the Gray Wolf From the List of Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife in Portions of the Conterminous United States, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,804,
15,804 (Apr. 1, 2003) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Final Rule Designating the
Western Great Lakes Populations of Gray Wolves as a Distinct Population Segment; Re-
moving the Western Great Lakes Distinct Population Segment of the Gray Wolf From the
List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. 6052, 6052 (Feb. 8, 2007) (to be
codified in 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
233. See Proposed Rule to Revise the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife for the Gray
Wolf (Canis lupus) in the Eastern United States, Initiation of Status Reviews for the Gray
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in addition to Minnesota, and then delisting that new DPS.
234 In its delisting
rule, the FWS concluded that delisting posed no threat to the western Great
Lakes population.235 The FWS relied heavily on the Minnesota Wolf Manage-
ment Plan ("MWMP") to demonstrate adequate regulatory mechanisms upon
delisting.236
The district court was unconvinced. It characterized the MWMP as estab-
lishing an "unregulated killing zone."237 It also criticized the FWS for discount-
ing the lack of regulatory mechanisms for other states in the DPS.
238 For
example, the court highlighted the fact that North Dakota does not have an
endangered species act, and in South Dakota, wolves are not listed as
threatened or endangered species.23 9 The closest thing to an adequate regulatory
mechanism was that some of the involved states had "closed seasons" for wolf
hunting. The FWS argued that six of the nine states in the DPS had very few,
if any, wolves. The court noted in response that the absence of established wolf
packs "[did] not foreclose the possibility of an increased presence there, since
the Final Rule makes clear that wolves show 'a high degree of mobility.'"240 The
court held that the agency failed to explain how current and fiture killing of
wolves would not "impact the recovered wolf populations in the DPS now or in
the foreseeable future."241
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that the state management plans were
adequate,2 42 and specifically rejected the district court's conclusion that the
MWMP created an "unregulated killing zone."
243 Rather, the two zones created
by the MWMP authorized wolf-killing in limited circumstances. Within
Northeastern Minnesota, which is "the core of the wolves' territory, wolves can
only be legally killed in defense of a human life, in situations of 'immediate
threat' to the life of a guard animal or domestic pet, or immediately after a
verified loss of livestock, domestic animals, or pets."
2" Within the rest of the
state, a controlled killing area can be opened for a lengthier period of time
following a verified loss of livestock, domestic animals, or pets.
245 The D.C.
Wolf and for the Eastern Wolf (Canis lycaon) (the "NPRM"), 76 Fed. Reg. 26,086 (May 5,
2011) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
234. See Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Jewell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 69, 96 (D.D.C. 2014).
235. Id. at 133; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D) (2018).
236. See Humane Soc'y, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 133-36.
237. Id. at 134.
238. See id. at 133-36.
239. See id.
240. Id. at 134.
241. Id.
242. Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Zinke, 865 F.3d 585, 609 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
243. Id. at 610.
244. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 97B.645, subdivs. 3, 5, 6 (2012)).
245. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 97B.671, subdiv. 4(b) (2012)).
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Circuit noted that these measures had been in place previously and the Minne-
sota wolf population had increased nonetheless.246
Regarding the district court's concern about the lack of conservation plans
in some involved states, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the FWS's assertion that
regulatory measures were not necessary given the near-absence of gray wolves in
those states,247 reasoning that the mortality of a lone wolf wandering into one of
these states would not threaten the sustainability of the DPS as a whole.248 The
court observed that the ESA "tasks the Service with determining whether the
species is endangered or threatened, not whether the species could reach still
higher population levels if given more protection."249
In the end, however, the D.C. Circuit upheld the district court's vacatur of
the 2011 delisting rule due to the "seriousness of the Rule's deficiencies" re-
garding the impacts of DPS delisting on the remaining populations of listed
wolves throughout the lower 48 states.250 In particular, the FWS's determina-
tion that the Great Lakes DPS was no longer threatened or endangered
throughout all or a significant portion of its range was arbitrary because the
FWS wrongly disregarded the wolves' lost historical range, which could impact
the species' survival in its current range.25i "Range loss can 'result[ ] in a species
for which distribution and abundance is restricted, gene flow is inhibited, or
population redundancy is reduced to such a level that the entity is now vulnera-
ble to extinction or likely to become so within the foreseeable future throughout
all or a significant portion of its current range."252
Although the wolf delisting rule was remanded, two aspects of it are rele-
vant to our consideration of adequate regulatory measures. First, as for state
requirements, it seems that the wolf management plans in the Great Lakes
states were "adequate" despite being rather minimal because they did not appear
to impede, and may have even aided, the growth of wolf populations.253 Second,
as for federal requirements, the court took comfort in the fact that the FWS is
required to continue monitoring the gray wolf for five years after delisting and
to make "prompt use" of its emergency powers "to prevent a significant risk to
246. Id. at 608.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 612.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 615 (internal citations omitted).
251. Id. at 605.
252. Id. at 606 (citing Final Policy on Interpretation of the Phrase -"Significant Portion of Its
Range" in the Endangered Species Act's Definitions, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,578, 37,584 (July 1,
2014) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R chpts. I, II)).
253. Id. at 612 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(g)(2)). Parallels can be seen in the Rocky Mountain
Gray Wolf recovery efforts. See Michael D. Jimenez et al., WolfDispersal in the Rocky Moun-
tains, Western United States: 1993-2008, 81 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 581, 581 (2017); see also
Williams, supra note 230, at 131-46.
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the well-being of any such recovered species."254 However, as we discuss below,
monitoring and the deployment of the rarely-used emergency listing power are
no panacea for a species at risk.255
B. Yellowstone Grizzly Bear
Like wolves, populations of grizzly bears (Ursus arctos horribilis) plum-
meted as European settlers and their livestock spread across the western United
States.256 Once abundant in mountain ranges from Canada to Mexico and from
the Great Plains to California, their numbers had dropped from around 50,000
in the nineteenth century to between 800 and 1,000 individuals by the early
1970s, and the species had been extirpated from 98% of its habitat in the lower
48 states.25 7
When the ESA was passed in 1973, grizzlies were one of the first species
to be listed as threatened.25 8 A recovery plan was adopted in 1982, and an Inter-
agency Grizzly Bear Committee ("IGBC") was formed by members of FWS,
the National Park Service, the Forest Service, the states of Montana, Idaho,
Washington, and Wyoming, and the province of British Columbia.
259
With a concerted effort by these partners, the grizzly population in the
Greater Yellowstone Area ("GYA") began to rebound. By the early 2000s, the
GYA grizzly population had been increasing at a rate of 4.2% to 7.6% per year
and had expanded its range by 48% since the 1970s. In 2006, the total grizzly
population in the GYA was estimated at more than 500 bears, and scientists
concluded that grizzlies were approaching the carrying capacity of Yellowstone
National Park.260
254. Id. at 610 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(g)(2 )). The court added, "Concerned entities also remain
free to petition the Service to relist the gray wolf should it be threatened once more." Id.
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)); see also Defs. of Wildlife v. Zinke, 849 F.3d 1077, 1084
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that the decision to delist Rocky Mountain gray wolves "in the
absence of legal certainty is compatible with the ESA's requirement for monitoring of the
species after delisting . . . and its emergency provisions authorizing the Secretary to take
immediate action to ensure the delisted species does not become threatened or endangered
again").
255. See infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
256. See Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting
that humans fear grizzlies, but, ironically, grizzlies have been "the more vulnerable ones," due
to "widespread hunting, trapping, poisoning, and habitat destruction").
257. Id. at 1020.
258. Amendment Listing the Grizzly Bear of the 48 Conterminous States as a Threatened Spe-
cies, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,734, 31,734-36 (July 28, 1975).
259. Grizzly Bears; Yellowstone Distinct Population; Notice of Petition Finding, Final Rule, 72
Fed. Reg. 14,866, 14,866-69 (Mar. 29, 2007).
260. Greater Yellowstone Coal., 665 F.3d at 1020.
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The FWS attempted to delist the GYA population in 2007 and then again
in 2017.261 Habitat protection and human-caused bear mortality were persistent
issues, both turning in part on the adequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms
outside of the ESA itself.
Steps along the way to the delisting decision included the 1982 recovery
plan, which aimed to foster self-sustaining grizzly populations in the GYA as
well as the Northern Continental Divide Ecosystem in Montana, the North
Cascades area in Washington, and the Selkirk and Cabinet-Yaak areas of
northern Idaho, Montana, and Washington.26 2 The recovery plan was revised in
1993, when the FWS delineated a "Recovery Zone" for each of these regions,
along with updated demographic recovery criteria and a commitment to the
development of a conservation strategy for each grizzly population to guide
management after delisting.26 3 The FWS subsequently added habitat-based re-
covery criteria to the Grizzly Bear Recovery Plan following a successful legal
challenge to its adequacy.264
The FWS's 2007 delisting decision relied heavily on the 2007 GYA Con-
servation Strategy for the Grizzly Bear, which was adopted in consultation with
the states of Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming.265 The Conservation Strategy re-
fers to forty federal laws, rules, guidelines, strategies, and reports and thirty-
three State laws, statutes, and regulations applicable to GYA grizzly manage-
ment.266 Eight federal and state entities signed a memorandum of understand-
261. Tom France & Daniel Brister, Bringing Back The Great Bear: Challenges and Opportunities Of
Grizzly Restoration in the Northern Rockies, 42 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L.R. 1, 11-15
(2020).
262. Greater Yellowstone Coal., 665 F.3d at 1019-20.
263. Id. (stating that recovery zones are areas "large enough and of sufficient habitat quality to
support a recovered bear population within which habitat and population would be
monitored").
264. See Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1995), amended by 967 F. Supp. 6
(1997) (finding that the recovery plan did not satisfy the ESA's "objective, measurable crite-
ria" requirement and that FWS had not provided a rational reason for the plan's monitoring
methods). The Center for Biological Diversity has lodged a new challenge to the Grizzly
recovery plan, which has not seen a comprehensive update since 1993. See Complaint, Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, No. 19-cv-00109 (D. Mont. June 27, 2019), 2019 WL
2745642.
265. See Greater Yellowstone Coal., 665 F.3d at 1019 (citing INTERAGENCY CONSERVATION
STRATEGY TEAM, FINAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR THE GRIZZLY BEAR IN THE
GREATER YELLOWSTONE AREA (2007)) (describing the Strategy as "an impressive inter-
agency, multi-state cooperative blueprint for long-term protection and management of a
sustainable grizzly population").
266. Grizzly Bears; Yellowstone Distinct Population; Notice of Petition Finding; Final Rule, 72
Fed. Reg. 14,865, 14,922-23 (Mar. 29, 2007). Many of these provisions predated the initial
listing in 1975. On appeal, Judge Sidney R. Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, noted that the requirements were not sufficient to prevent listing in the first place, and
that "most of the listed laws and regulations do not specifically relate to grizzly protection;
rather, they involve generic environmental and resource management." Greater Yellowstone
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ing agreeing to implement the Conservation Strategy: the FWS; the U.S.
Forest Service; the National Park Service; the U.S. Geological Survey; the Bu-
reau of Land Management; the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and
Parks; the Wyoming Game and Fish Department; and the Idaho Department
of Fish and Game.267
In Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Servheen,268 a federal district court va-
cated the delisting rule for failing to ensure adequate, legally binding regulatory
mechanisms upon delisting, and for failing to address potential bear mortality
due to declining food sources, especially whitebark pine, among other things.
269
With regard to regulatory mechanisms, the court held that the Service relied on
too many measures that were not legally binding and, for those measures that
were legally binding, failed to explain how they would actually protect the GYA
grizzly population from sliding into decline.
270
The Conservation Strategy establishes habitat standards inside the
Primary Conservation Area (PCA) for permissible changes to secure
habitat, the number and capacity of developed sites, and livestock al-
lotments. . . . However, it does not contain analogous standards for
lands outside the PCA; instead, it states that "agencies will cooperate
with the appropriate state wildlife agency in development of addi-
tional future, area-specific grizzly bear management goals."271
The district court observed that "promises of future, speculative action are
not existing regulatory mechanisms."27
2 It also found that the Conservation
Coal., 665 F.3d at 1035 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As an exam-
ple, Thomas noted that the Strategy cited "a federal act establishing a highway between
national parks as a statute aimed at protecting the grizzly." Id.
267. Id. at 1021.
268. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Servheen, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (D. Mont. 2009), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 665 F.3d 1015, 1030 (9th Cir. 2011).
269. Id. at 1126.
270. Id. at 1113-15.
271. Id. at 1115 (emphasis in original). The PCA is a 9,210 square-mile area encompassing Yel-
lowstone National Park and adjacent, primarily public, land. The area is 98% Park Service
and Forest Service land, and includes approximately 51% of suitable habitat in the GYA and
between 84% and 90% of the GYA's population of female grizzlies with cubs. Greater Yel-
lowstone Coal., 665 F.3d at 1021.
272. Greater Yellowstone Coal., 672 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (citing Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Daley, 6
F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1155 (D. Or. 1998); Fed'n of Fly Fishers v. Daley, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1158,
1165, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). Pursuant to the Conservation Strategy, the state management
plans "recommend and encourage [state] land management agencies to maintain or improve
habitats that are important to grizzly bears and to monitor habitat conditions." Greater Yel-
lowstone Coal., 665 F.3d at 1022 (emphasis added). The state plans "are premised on moni-
toring and future actions, and they contain few, if any, enforceable standards." Greater
Yellowstone Coal., 672 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. The Wyoming plan, for example, contained
"only 'general management guidelines' for habitat and managing nuisance bears, which can-
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Strategy's monitoring protocols were similarly lacking. Not only were the pro-
tocols unenforceable, "[t]he Service and other agencies are not required to take
any concrete response to protect grizzlies if monitoring shows population or
habitat declines, but only to 'identify' the problems and make recommendations
for changes."27 3
For the district court, the coup de grce was the FWS's lack of authority to
enforce any of the measures contained within the Conservation Strategy, state
or federal, except for one: keeping the GYA grizzly population above 500
bears.27 4 According to the court, even if the Conservation Strategy contained
sufficient standards, there was no evidence that the state and federal agencies
could be compelled to comply. 2 75 The court quoted the FWS's response to
comments found in the final delisting rule:
We [the FWS] have no authority to compel the States to enact
laws.... While the Strategy cannot legally compel any of the signatories
to implement management policies or obligate funding, the various Fed-
eral agencies and State governments' signatures on the Strategy
clearly indicate their intention to manage grizzly bears according to
the Strategy.276
According to the district court, "[a]n 'intention' or 'commitment' to manage
grizzly bears a certain way is not a regulatory mechanism," and it cannot satisfy
the ESA's delisting requirements.2 77
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling that the
Service failed to support its determination that whitebark pine declines were
not a threat, "given the lack of data indicating grizzly population stability in the
face of such declines, and the substantial data indicating a direct correlation
between whitebark pine seed availability and grizzly survival and
reproduction."2 78
The Ninth Circuit also highlighted the importance of adequate regulatory
mechanisms to the delisting decision.279 In particular, the potential for relisting,
if post delisting monitoring data shows population declines, is not adequate:
not legally be enforced because guidelines are discretionary." Id. In addition to treating de-
listed bears as "trophy" game, Wyoming "flatly states that it will not allow grizzlies to
reoccupy certain mountain ranges, and that it will enforce that policy through sport hunting
and removal." Greater Yellowstone Coal, 665 F.3d at 1035 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
273. Greater Yellowstone Coal., 672 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
274. Id. at 1115-16.
275. Id. at 1116.
276. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting from the administrative record).
277. Id. at 1116.
278. Greater Yellowstone Coal v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011).
279. Id. at 1030.
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We reject out of hand any suggestion that future possibility of relist-
ing a species can operate as a reasonable justification for delisting.
Whatever comfort may be taken in relisting as a safety net, it is no answer
to conclude that a species is not threatened simply because it can be relisted
if it is threatened.28 0
However, unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit found that the Con-
servation Strategy's regulatory mechanisms were adequate because monitoring
and relisting were not the only measures adopted in the delisting decision;
rather, there were other "clearly binding regulatory mechanisms" in the Conser-
vation Strategy.281 The court expressed approval for the "breadth of these mea-
sures" provided in the Conservation Strategy, which it described as a "tribute to
the comprehensive multi-jurisdictional cooperative effort between federal and
state agencies, as well as private interest groups."
2 2 Ultimately, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that the federal provisions incorporated by the Conservation Strat-
egy, including the National Forest Plans, National Park Compendia, and the
protections afforded by the Wilderness Act, were sufficiently enforceable, and
therefore adequate regulatory mechanisms, to pass muster for delisting.
2 8
3
In his partial dissent in Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Judge Thomas
pointed out that no state or federal regulation actually enforced the grizzly bear
mortality standards.28 4 He explained, "[n]ot only did the Service rely on volun-
tary, rather than 'regulatory,' measures, but it did not explain adequately how
existing regulatory mechanisms actually prevent grizzly bear mortality. "285
280. Id. at 1029 (emphasis added). The court remarked, "For adaptive management of a potential
threat to suffice as a basis for a delisting determination, we believe that more specific man-
agement responses, tied to more specific triggering criteria, are required." Id.
281. Id. at 1032.
282. Id. ("The multi-state commitment to implement the Strategy represents a substantial wildlife
conservation planning achievement-and one that, we have no doubt, ultimately improves
the lot of the Yellowstone grizzly bear. . . . [W]e need not, and do not, consider those
measures, some or all of which may not be binding, because we hold that the clearly binding
regulatory mechanisms discussed above suffice.").
283. See id. at 1031. The majority described a Compendium as "'a summary of the rulemaking
implemented under the discretionary authority of the Park Superintendent' in a particular
National Park, and consist[ing] of regulations which augment the generally applicable Park
Service regulations . . . Therefore, the incorporation of the Strategy's population standards
[into the Compendia] gives these standards . .. federal regulatory force, and the Park Service
must adhere to them." Id. The majority also concluded that, within the PCA designated,
both the Forest Service and the Park Service were "legally bound to uphold key Strategy
standards . . . because these agencies collectively own and manage 98% of the land there." Id.
Beyond the boundaries of the PCA, "roughly 30 percent of all suitable habitat .. . is within a
designated Wilderness Area [which] does not allow road construction, new livestock allot-
ments, or new oil, gas, and mining developments." Id.
284. See id. at 1034 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
285. Id. at 1033 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Merely compiling a list
of potentially applicable statutes and regulations is not sufficient; the agency must explain
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Good intentions are not rules of law. Unenforceable aspirational goals
are not regulatory mechanisms. Promises to monitor, review, and
convene committees do not satisfy the statutory requirement.28 6
Because the Service had taken a detour from its repeated recognition of the
need for binding conservation measures to protect grizzlies from the very same
threats that led to their decline in the first place, Judge Thomas would have
affirmed the district court's decision in its entirety.287
In the aftermath of Greater Yellowstone Coalition, on remand, the Service
determined that decreased whitebark pine seed did not pose a substantial threat
to the continued viability of the GYA grizzly population due to the availability
of other natural food sources." The Service initiated a new delisting process,
approved a new Conservation Strategy, and issued a new rule to delist the GYA
population in 2017.289
The Crow Indian Tribe and a coalition of environmental and animal
rights groups challenged the 2017 delisting rule on the grounds that the Service
failed to analyze the impact of delisting the GYA grizzly population on the
other remaining grizzly populations within the continental United States, and
that its application of the five-factor threats analysis required by the ESA was
arbitrary and capricious.290 Plaintiffs alleged that the FWS acted arbitrarily
"when it isolated and delisted a distinct population segment without consider-
ing the legal and functional impact on the remainder of the species."29 1 They
also challenged the adequacy of regulatory mechanisms for minimizing grizzly
mortality. According to the plaintiffs, the FWS had unlawfully relied on the
why these laws and regulations constitute adequate regulatory mechanisms for grizzly pro-
tection." Id. at 1036 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
286. Id. at 1034 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Norton v. So. Utah
Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004) (noting that monitoring is not a legally binding nor
enforceable commitment under the Administrative Procedure Act)). Judge Thomas went on
to say that "[m]ere citation to potentially applicable statutes and regulations without analysis
does not fulfill the Service's obligation to explain how they act as adequate regulatory mecha-
nisms for protection of the grizzly." Id. at 1036 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); see also Goble, Talk, supra note 12, at 17 (regarding generally applicable, but not
necessarily adequate, federal and state statutes such as the Clean Water Act and zoning
regulations).
287. Greater Yellowstone Coal., 665 F.3d at 1034, 1036 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
288. Removing the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem Population of Grizzly Bears from the Federal
List of Endangered & Threatened Wildlife, 82 Fed Reg. 30,502, 30,539 (June 30, 2017)
[hereinafter Grizzly Bear Delisting Rule].
289. Id. at 30,502-05.
290. Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, No. 17-89, 2018 WL 4145908, at *2 (D. Mont. Aug.




states' general promises to manage mortality.29 2 In the delisting rule, the FWS
concluded that.the states have been "funding and performing the majority of
grizzly bear recovery, management, monitoring, and enforcement efforts within
their jurisdictions for decades."293 It believed there was "not a reasonable basis"
to suppose the states would not fully fund GYA grizzly recovery efforts.
294
Plaintiffs attempted to distinguish the 2017 delisting rule from the previ-
ous rule's treatment of adequate regulatory mechanisms, which the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld in Greater Yellowstone Coalition.2 s The district court, finding itself
bound by that precedent, upheld the FWS's decision that, through the regula-
tory mechanisms specified in the Conservation Strategy, the states would ade-
quately manage the GYA population upon delisting.
296
In particular, the court noted that, in both delisting rules, human-caused
bear mortality had been a major focus of both grizzly recovery and planning for
post-delisting management.297 The 2017 Conservation Strategy includes popu-
lation/mortality management standards to maintain a recovered grizzly popula-
tion in the future, and requires monitoring to ensure that a viable GYA
population is maintained.298 It specifies objective, measurable habitat and popu-
lation criteria, and delineates specific state and federal management responses if
deviations occur.299 All of the state and federal parties signed a memorandum of
understanding in which they agreed to implement the Conservation Strategy.
3 *
In turn, Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana entered into a Tri-State Memoran-
dum of Agreement ("MOA"), in which they agreed to implement the mortality
criteria in the Conservation Strategy and to allocate discretionary mortality,
through hunting licenses, among the states.3 01 The court refused to "second-
guess the states' willingness and ability to manage a delisted grizzly
population."302
292. Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1015-16 (D. Mont. 2018).
293. Id. at 1016 (citing Grizzly Bear Delisting Rule, supra note 288, at 30,603).
294. Id.
295. Id. (citing Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Servheen, 672 F. Supp. 3d 1015, 1032 (9th Cir.
2011)).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1015-16.
298. See Grizzly Bear Delisting Rule, supra note 288, at 30,515.
299. Id. The Conservation Strategy states that maintenance of grizzly populations in accordance
with the population standards is a state responsibility. Id. at 30,516.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 30,502; see also Opening Brief of Appellees the Humane Society of the U.S. & the
Fund for Animals at 46-7, Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, Nos. 18-36030, 18-36038,
18-36042, 18-36050, 18-36077, 18-36078, 18-36079, and 18-36080 (9th Cir. Aug. 5,
2019) (noting that the grizzly bear Conservation Strategy "allocates 'discretionary mortality'
quotas-for recreational hunting and management kills-in accordance with the total allow-
able mortality limit," which, in turn, "directly influence state management actions").
302. Crow Indian Tribe, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 1015.
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Despite finding adequate regulatory mechanisms, the court vacated the
2017 delisting rule because the FWS had acted arbitrarily in several other ways,
in large part due to the intense pressure exerted by the states upon the FWS to
delist the GYA population.303 According to the court, "by dropping a key com-
mitment-the commitment to ensure that any population estimator adopted in
the future is calibrated to the estimator used to justify delisting-the Service
illegally negotiated away its obligation to apply the best available science in
order to reach an accommodation with the states of Wyoming, Idaho, and
Montana."3 4 It added, "all the evidence cited by the parties supports the Plain-
tiffs' position that (1) the Service and other scientists viewed a recalibration
provision as essential; and (2) the Service chose to forego such a provision in
order to get a deal with the states."3 05 In the end, "[riather than maintain
heightened protections in the face of a recognized threat to the health of the
Greater Yellowstone grizzly, the Service accepted a 'compromise' that was in
effect a capitulation."0
Per the court, the FWS's final deficiency was their failure to analyze how
reducing protection for the GYA population would affect the remaining mem-
bers of the lower-48 grizzly designation.3 07 According to the court, "the Service
is engaged in a process of real-time 'balkanization' criticized by the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Humane Society: 'when a species is already listed, the Service cannot
review a single segment with blinders on, ignoring the continuing status of the
species' remnant. The statute requires a comprehensive review of the entire
listed species and its continuing status.' "308
303. Id. at 1016-18.
304. Id. at 1004. This issue turns on technical decisions related to population modeling. The
court found that "[bjetween the draft and final versions of the Conservation Strategy, the
Service removed its commitment to recalibration-the mechanism by which estimates gen-
erated by a new population estimator, if adopted, would be brought in line with those gener-
ated by the current estimator, the Chao2 model." Id. at 1015. FWS admitted that the Chao2
model is "highly conservative" and likely to underestimate population size. Id. at 1018. The
court noted, "Given that Chao2 is known to create low estimates, it stands to reason that a
more accurate model would generate a higher population estimate." Id.
305. Id. ("[A]ll available evidence demonstrates that the Service made its decision not on the basis
of science or the law but solely in reaction to the states' hardline position on recalibration.").
306. Id. at 1018.
307. Id. at 1013.
308. Id. at 1008-09 (citing Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Zinke, 865 F.3d 585, 601 (D.C. Cir.
2017)). The other rationale for vacating the delisting rule is less illuminating for the central
thesis of this article. One court found that the FWS's reliance on two studies that it had
"cobbled together" to support its determination that the GYA grizzly could be independent
and genetically self-sufficient was "illogical, as both studies conclude that the long-term
health of the Greater Yellowstone grizzly depends on the introduction of new genetic mate-
rial." Id. at 1004, 1020.
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The states filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and the federal govern-
ment soon followed.3 09 As of this writing, the appeal is pending. Regardless of
the outcome of this case on appeal, the district court's decision in Crow Indian
Tribe offers a compelling lesson about the appropriate role of the FWS in
maintaining some degree of oversight of the population health of a recently
delisted species. The decision is a clear rebuke of the FWS too quickly stepping
aside and ceding control of the still-recovering GYA grizzly population to non-
federal decision-makers. This delegation was particularly problematic in this
case, where the involved states had consistently demonstrated a troubling eager-
ness to avoid hard, science-based commitments for monitoring the post-delist-
ing health of the GYA grizzly population. While the district court did not put
it in these terms, its decision can be fairly read to argue for an ESA delisting
process that provides the species with a gradual and thoughtful transition from
the comprehensive protections of the ESA to its post-delisting reality. In other
words, it points to a "soft release" that seeks to ensure the species is best-posi-
tioned for post-listing success through adequate regulatory mechanisms before
stepping away rather than a "hard release" that may leave too much to chance
and result in a relisting of the species. The question for the remainder of this
Article is what such a "soft release" would entail and whether it may be a viable
alternative to the status quo.
V. A "Sorr RELEASE": RECOVERY CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS
AND OTHER POTENTIAL TOOLS
In this Part, we argue for a "soft release" alternative to delisting, where the
FWS continues to play a supervisory role with responsibility for the newly re-
covered species, and the species automatically or quickly goes back on the list if
thresholds, triggers, and standards are not met. We reject the possibility of
relisting as a backstop to a failed "hard release," as many courts have held, and
we explore the use of enhanced Recovery Plans with components of CCAs as
part of a successful "soft release" strategy.
In Greater Yellowstone Coalition, the FWS relied on monitoring, adaptive
management, and the potential for relisting, if necessary, to justify its decision
to delist the GYA Grizzly bear population despite scientific uncertainty. The
Ninth Circuit was clear that relisting is not an adequate regulatory mechanism,
even when coupled with monitoring and adaptive management. In fact, the
court flatly rejected the notion that the potential for relisting in the future could
serve as a rationale for delisting. It admonished, "[w]hatever comfort may be
taken in relisting as a safety net, it is no answer to conclude that a species is not
threatened simply because it can be relisted if it is threatened."
10
309. Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, No. 18-36077 (9th Cir. 2018).
310. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis
added).
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Thus, the potential for relisting is not sufficient to correct for situations
when species have been delisted too hastily, or when circumstances change,
placing the species in peril once again. The typical delisting rule provides that
the FWS will monitor delisted species for five years, and states that "[i]f evi-
dence acquired during this monitoring period shows that endangered or
threatened status should be reinstated to prevent a significant risk to the spe-
cies, the Service may use the emergency listing authority provided for by the
Act." 1' As Professor Dan Rohlf notes, "the Services to date have conducted
monitoring and reviews only on an ad hoc basis-to the limited extent that
they have complied with these requirements at all." 3 12 Whether due to lack of
data, lack of finances, or lack of political will, the FWS rarely reinitiates relist-
ing absent a court order.313
The FWS could invoke its authority to issue an emergency listing, which
takes effect immediately and lasts up to 240 days.314 However, this power has
been used sparingly and it does not provide an adequate response to the recur-
ring problems of finding shortfalls, political pressure, and other priorities.3 11
Absent an emergency listing, it takes twelve years, on average, to list a species;
during that time, the unprotected species may experience further population
declines and habitat losses, or even go extinct.316 Thus, to rely on the possibility
of relisting is far from adequate.
Could enhanced recovery plans be utilized to achieve a successful delisting
"soft release"? One piece of the delisting-recovery puzzle may be to amend the
ESA to make recovery plans mandatory for all listed species, and to require the
311. See, e.g., Removal of Arctic Peregrine Falcon From the List of Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,803 (Oct. 5, 1994).
312. Rohlf, supra note 97, at 543. Rohlf found "no indication[ ] that FWS has an organized effort
to monitor any 'warranted but precluded' species on an ongoing basis, though informal as-
sessments may occasionally occur." Among all delisted species, the agencies have monitored,
at best, "on an ad hoc basis," three of them. Id. at 544.
313. Id. at 543 & n.230. One of the authors conducted a simplistic survey of the Federal Register
database in Westlaw, using search terms related to reinitiating listing, or relisting, and found
less than 20 actions since 1999.
314. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7) (2018); see also 50 C.F.R. § 424.20(a) (2019) ("the Secretary may at
any time issue a regulation ... in regard to any emergency posing a significant risk to the
well-being of a species of fish, wildlife, or plant. Such rules shall, at the discretion of the
Secretary, take effect immediately on publication in the Federal Register.")
315. John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots Legislation,
52 HASTINGs L.J. 1149, 1176 (2001) (citing City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927
(D.C. Cir. 1987); James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act under the Microscope: A
Closeup Look from a Litigator's Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499, 520 (1991)). Kunich explains
that, because "they merely postpone rather than obviate the need for the usual array of proce-
dural steps, [emergency listings] have not been much of an answer to the ESA's problems
with delay and administrative tangle." Kunich, supra, at 1176; see also Rohlf; supra note 97, at
543 & n.230 (noting the small number of emergency listings of warranted but
precluded species).
316. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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FWS to ensure that the plans are updated regularly and that the criteria con-
tained within recovery plans are met before a species could be delisted.1 Re-
covery plans include site specific management actions necessary to recover the
species; objective, measurable recovery and delisting criteria; and estimates of
the time and cost required to carry out those measures needed to recover and
conserve the species.31' Recovery plans are typically developed by scientists, and
meeting the plan's goals should be a decent indication that a species is
recovered.3 19
In promoting or defending its recovery plans, the FWS has asserted that
they are "based on the best scientific information available, address[ ] the scien-
tific peer reviewers' comments, and include [ ] recent scientific information
[such as] climate change and habitat modeling."
320 Advocates involved in the
long-running northern spotted owl controversy are on point when they observe
that "[riecovery plans are more than a paper exercise, and they must mean
something," especially given the amount of time, money, and energy devoted to
them.32'
Skeptics would argue that recovery plans are "necessarily tentative," due to
the uncertainties inherent in conservation biology.
3 22 Given the unforeseen vari-
ables that play a role in species recovery and conservation, "[a] species might
recover in a way not contemplated by the recovery plan, or conversely, meeting
all the recovery plan goals might fail to recover a species."3
23 If recovery plans
were both mandatory and adaptable, however, the FWS could not ignore the
carefully considered factors that are designed to result in recovery of the spe-
cies. 3 2 4 The FWS would be required to ensure that recovery goals are met, but
the means of meeting these goals could be flexible. If recovery goals are inade-
317. Martin F. J. Taylor et al., The Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act: A Quantitative
Analysis, 55 BIOSCIENCE 360, 366 (2005). For details on the contents, strengths, and weak-
nesses of recovery planning as implemented under the ESA, see Part II, supra.
318. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing requirements for ESA recovery
plans).
319. Lauren Hudson, Flying in the Face of the Endangered Species Act? Delisting the West Virginia
Northern Flying Squirrel, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q 549, 553 (2013); see also Anderson, supra note
117, at 221, 225 (stating that "recovery plans ... have the purpose of helping bring species to
a level where delisting is appropriate, [but] the plans are not always followed," and citing the
grizzly bear as an example of a delisting failure due to an inadequate recovery plan).
320. Susan Jane M. Brown & Jordan Beckett, A Case Study for the Implementation of Recovery
Plans to Conserve Listed Species, 30 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 18, 19 (2016); see also id. at
19-21 (discussing the northern spotted owl recovery plan).
321. Id. at 21.
322. Goble, Recovery, supra note 17, at 90.
323. Hudson, supra note 319, at 553.
324. Id. (citing Erik Harvey et al., Recovery Plan Revisions: Progress or Due Process? 12 ECOLOGI-
CAL APPLICATIONS 682, 682 (2002)) ("The ... ESA ... provides for flexibility and respon-
siveness in the recovery planning process by authorizing revision of recovery plans when new
information arises or when the status of the species changes."). But see supra Part II (discuss-
ing how infrequently recovery plans are issued and revised).
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quate, the recovery plan should be revised to reflect new data and current un-
derstanding about the needs of the species.
In terms of successful delisting-recovery components, the PECE policy
could be utilized to determine whether formalized conservation efforts by fed-
eral and non-federal collaborators are effective in sustaining recovered popula-
tions and their habitat.3 25 Only the second prong of the PECE test for
evaluating CCAs, the certainty that the conservation efforts contained in the
CCA will be effective at reducing threats to the species, would be relevant in
the delisting context. When it makes a delisting decision, the FVVS already
knows that proposed conservation efforts have been implemented.3 26 All that is
left to do is to evaluate the certainty that the efforts will be effective at continu-
ing to mitigate or eradicate threats to the species.327 Granted, this is no easy
task, but evaluative criteria could be revised to fit the delisting context in the
form of a Recovery Conservation Agreement, as follows:
In evaluating the certainty of whether the conservation efforts will continue to
be effective, the FWS considers:
the nature and extent of the [present and reasonably foreseeable fu-
ture] threats to the species to be addressed and how these threats [will
continue to be reduced by the conservation effort;] the . . . specific
conservation objectives [at present and over time;] the appropriate
steps to reduce threats to the species [in the absence of ESA require-
ments and prohibitions; who must take those steps, and how infrac-
tions will be enforced;] [a]nd . . . quantifiable performance measures
to monitor for both compliance and effectiveness[.]32
This may sound straightforward, but of course it is anything but, given the
changing nature of our landscapes and our land uses, and the synergistic effects
of these changes on communities of species. Even so, the lessons learned from
CCAs that have been successful in the front end of the ESA process-the
listing context-should be considered in the delisting context, to strengthen
325. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
326. PECE, supra note 85, at 15,101.
327. Id.
328. Id. The FWS's 2019 listing regulation revises the definition of "foreseeable future" to extend
"only so far into the future as the Services can reasonably determine that both the future
threats and the species' responses to those threats are likely." Factors for listing, delisting, or
reclassifying species, 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d) (2019). This definition is too narrow with re-
spect to listing, delisting, and recovery. Limiting the "foreseeable future" to a chronological
endpoint where harmful conditions are "likely" may prevent the FWS from factoring long-
range climate change projections into its analysis of continuing or future threats to the
species.
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Memoranda of Understanding and other types of agreements that have become
relatively commonplace at the back end of the ESA process.
3 29
CONCLUSION
As the Arctic grayling, gray wolf, Grizzly bear, and greater sage-grouse
cases indicate, coordinated efforts across jurisdictional lines through cooperative
federalism and private initiatives provide a crucial means for imperiled species
to make progress toward recovery.33 0 Enhanced recovery plans and CCA-like
agreements could play a similar role in the delisting process, working in concert
to provide a roadmap to lasting recovery. Rather than relying on the possibility
of relisting a species as a kind of "do over" when a poorly planned and executed
delisting process fails, the FWS should apply the lessons learned from success-
ful CCAs to the delisting process. Among these lessons are the importance of
bringing all critical players (federal, state, tribal, and private) in a species' health
to the table to receive their input and obtain their commitments to implement-
ing measures to assist in the species' recovery, the critical need for the FWS to
provide consistent and informed oversight throughout the recovery process, and
an insistence on the primacy of science-based solutions over political compro-
mise. Reconfiguring the delisting process in this manner will undoubtedly re-
quire a greater investment of time, effort, and resources than currently
expended in the hard release paradigm utilized today, which is no small thing in
the current political and fiscal environment. Ultimately, however, it is a small
price to pay for the improved post-listing results that a shift to a soft release
approach would give to the recovering species.
329. See Williams, supra note 230, at 113 ("Some of the creativity and shared responsibility that
has allowed the USFWS to not list a species should apply to delisting as well."). As this
article goes to press, another means of addressing the binary nature of listing-delisting deci-
sions has been proposed by Justin Pidot, who advocates "contingent delisting," which would
treat a recovered species' listing as dormant, rather than non-existent, thereby facilitating
expedient restoration of a listing "if certain foreseeable events materialize that signal renewed
danger to a species' viability." Justin R. Pidot, Contingent Delisting, 91 U. COLO. L. REv.
649, 652 (2020). We support the idea, and believe that the triggering events could be in-
cluded in a Recovery Conservation Plan.
330. See Robert L. Fischman &Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution Con-
trol Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered SpeciesAct, 27 CoLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 45, 72 (2002) ("The conservation imperative of comprehensive planning requires
the Services to enlist the help of state and local jurisdictions with the authority, experience,
and desire to incorporate species recovery needs into land use controls.").
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